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Abstract
Recent results by Alagic and Russell have given some evidence that the
Even-Mansour cipher may be secure against quantum adversaries with quan-
tum queries, if considered over other groups than (Z/2)n. This prompts the
question as to whether or not other classical schemes may be generalized to
arbitrary groups and whether classical results still apply to those generalized
schemes.
In this thesis, we generalize the Even-Mansour cipher and the Feistel
cipher. We show that Even and Mansour’s original notions of secrecy are
obtained on a one-key, group variant of the Even-Mansour cipher. We gen-
eralize the result by Kilian and Rogaway, that the Even-Mansour cipher is
pseudorandom, to super pseudorandomness, also in the one-key, group case.
Using a Slide Attack we match the bound found above. After generalizing
the Feistel cipher to arbitrary groups we resolve an open problem of Patel,
Ramzan, and Sundaram by showing that the 3-round Feistel cipher over an
arbitrary group is not super pseudorandom.
We generalize a result by Gentry and Ramzan showing that the Even-
Mansour cipher can be implemented using the Feistel cipher as the public
permutation. In this result, we also consider the one-key case over a group
and generalize their bound.
Finally, we consider Zhandry’s result on quantum pseudorandom per-
mutations, showing that his result may be generalized to hold for arbitrary
groups. In this regard, we consider whether certain card shuffles may be
generalized as well.
Tak til min mor,
min far,
Finn og Dorte.
Med hele mit hjerte,
tak for alt Jeres støtte.
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1 Introduction
In many branches of mathematics, physics, economics, and others, randomness is
of great importance. In mathematics, it is generally assumed, especially in proba-
bility theory, that true randomness exists. The question therefore becomes whether
or not such true randomness exists in reality. In cryptography as well, it is assumed
that true randomness exists, lest all cryptographic security falls apart. However,
the authenticity of sources of true randomness can be debated. Cryptography of-
fers an alternative to true randomness: pseudorandomness. Pseudorandomness is
something which looks truly random to certain observers, but is not actually so.
Over time, cryptographers have constructed many candidates for pseudorandom
generators, pseudorandom functions, and pseudorandom permutations. One type
of construction, is the so-called block cipher.
In [EM97], Even and Mansour introduced and proved security for the DES
inspired block cipher scheme we now call the Even-Mansour (EM) scheme. Given
a public permutation, P , over n-bit strings, with two different, random, secret,
n-bit keys k1 and k2, a message x ∈ {0, 1}n could be enciphered as
EMPk1,k2(x) = P (x⊕ k1)⊕ k2,
with an obvious decryption using the inverse public permutation. The scheme was
minimal, in the sense that they needed to XOR a key before and after the permu-
tation, otherwise the remaining key could easily be found. As an improvement,
Dunkelman, Keller, and Shamir [DKS12] showed that there was only a need for a
single key and the scheme would still retain an indistinguishability from random,
i.e. it was pseudorandom. As another consideration of block ciphers, the Feistel ci-
pher construction of Luby and Rackoff [LR88] showed how to build pseudorandom
permutations from pseudorandom functions.
Eventually, Kuwakado and Morii showed that both the EM scheme [KM12] and
the Feistel scheme [KM10] could be broken by quantum adversaries with quantum
queries. Rather than discard these beautiful constructions entirely, Alagic and
Russell [AR17] considered whether it would be possible to define the two-key EM
scheme over abelian groups in order to retain security against quantum adversaries
with quantum queries. What they showed was a security reduction to the Hidden
Shift Problem, over certain groups, such as Z/2n and Sn. This result inspires us to
ask whether the EM and Feistel schemes can be generalized over all groups, and
if so, whether or not we can get pseudorandomness in some model.
1.1 Prior Work
In extension of their simplification of the EM scheme, Dunkelman, Keller, and
Shamir [DKS12] attacked the construction using variants of slide attacks in order
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to show that the security bound was optimal. They further considered other
variants of the EM scheme, such as the Addition Even-Mansour with an Involution
as the Permutation (two-keyed). Also Kilian and Rogaway [KR01] were inspired
by DESX and EM to define their FX construction, of which the EM scheme is a
special case.
As referred to above, Kuwakado and Morii were able to break the EM scheme
[KM12] and the 3-round Feistel scheme [KM10] on n-bit strings, using Simon’s
algorithm, if able to query their oracle with a superposition of states. Kaplan et
al. [KLLNP16], using Kuwakado and Morii’s results, showed how to break many
classical cipher schemes, which in turn incited Alagic and Russell [AR17].
In their work with the Hidden Shift Problem, [AR17] posit that a Feistel ci-
pher construction over other groups than the bit strings group might be secure
against quantum adversaries with quantum queries. Many Feistel cipher variants
exist, with different relaxations on the round functions, see for example [NR99] and
[PRS02], the latter of which also considered Feistel ciphers over other groups. Vau-
denay [Vau98] also considered Feistel ciphers over other groups in order to protect
such ciphers against differential analysis attacks by what he called decorrelation.
Removed from the schemes considered below and with a greater degree of
abstraction, Black and Rogaway [BR02] consider ciphers over arbitrary domains
which Hoang, Morris, and Rogaway [HMR12, MR14] do as well. More generally,
Zhandry [Zha16] defines the notion of Function to Permutation Converters in order
to show that the existence of quantum one-way functions imply the existence of
quantum pseudorandom permutations.
1.2 Summary of Results
We work in the Random Oracle Model and consider groups G in the family of
finite groups, G. We consider pseudorandom permutations, given informally as
the following.
Definition 1. [Informal] A keyed permutation P on a group G is a Pseudo-
random Permutation (PRP) on G if it is indistinguishable from a random
permutation for all probabilistic distinguishers having access to only polynomially
many permutation-oracle queries.
A Super Pseudorandom Permutation (SPRP) is a permutation where
the distinguisher is given access to the inverse permutation-oracle as well.
We define the Group Even-Mansour (EM) scheme on G to be the encryp-
tion scheme having the encryption algorithm
Ek(m) = P (m · k) · k,
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where m ∈ G is the plaintext and k ∈ G is the uniformly random key.
We define two problems for the Group Even-Mansour scheme: Existential
Forgery (EFP) and Cracking (CP). In EFP, the adversary must eventually out-
put a plaintext-ciphertext pair which satisfies correctness. In CP, the adversary is
given a ciphertext and asked to find the corresponding plaintext.
It holds that for our Group EM scheme, the probability that an adversary
succeeds in the EFP is polynomially bounded:
Theorem 2. [Informal] If P is a uniformly random permutation on G and k ∈
G is chosen uniformly at random. Then, for any probabilistic adversary A, the
success probability of solving the EFP is negligible, specifically, bounded by
O
(
st
|G|
)
,
where s and t are the amount of encryption/decryption- and permutation/inverse
permutation-oracle queries, respectively.
By a basic reduction, and for the latter, by an inference result, we also get that
Theorem 3. [Informal] If P is a super pseudorandom permutation on G and
k ∈ G is chosen uniformly at random. For any probabilistic adversary A, the
success probability of solving the EFP is negligible.
Corollary 4. [Informal] If P is a super pseudorandom permutation on G and k ∈
G is chosen uniformly at random. For any polynomial-time probabilistic adversary
A, the success probability of solving the CP is negligible.
With the same bound as in Theorem 2, we find that
Theorem 5. [Informal] For any probabilistic adversary A, limited to polyno-
mially many encryption- and decryption-oracle queries and polynomially many
permutation- and inverse permutation-oracle queries, the Group EM scheme over
a group G is a super pseudorandom permutation.
We then apply a Slide Attack, to find an attack which matches the bound given
above.
Considering the Group Feistel cipher, whose encryption algorithm consists
of multiple uses of the round function
Ff (x, y) = (y, x · f(y)),
where f is a pseudorandom function on G, we show that the 3-round Feistel ci-
pher is pseudorandom but is not super pseudorandom, regardless of the underlying
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group G. We then note that the 4-round Feistel cipher is super pseudorandom as
proven in [PRS02].
Finally, we consider theGroup Even-Mansour scheme instantiated using
a 4-round Feistel cipher over G2 = G×G, which uses the encryption algorithm
Ψf,gk (m) = Fg,f,f,g(m · k) · k,
where f and g are modelled as random functions, m ∈ G2 the plaintext, and
k ∈ G2 is a uniformly random key. We then show one of our main results:
Theorem 6. [Informal] For any probabilistic 4-oracle adversary A with at most
• qc queries to the Ψ- and inverse Ψ-oracles (or random oracles),
• qf queries to the f -oracle, and
• qg queries to the g-oracle,
we have that the success probability of A distinguishing between Ψ and a random
oracle, is bounded by
(2q2c + 4qfqc + 4qgqc + q
2
c − qc)|G|−1 + 2 ·
(
qc
2
)
(2|G|−1 + |G|−2).
We may also rewrite our main theorem as the following:
Theorem 7. [Informal] For any 4-oracle adversary A, with at most q total
queries, we have that the success probability of A distinguishing between Ψ and a
random oracle, is bounded by
2(3q2 − q)|G|−1 + (q2 − q)|G|−2.
We note that this main result is due to [GR04], however, we consider a one-key
group version and add details to their proof sketches.
Using Zhandry [Zha16], we generalize the notion of a Function to Permuta-
tion Converter:
Definition 8. [Informal] A Function to Permutation Converter (FPC) is a pair
of efficient classical oracle algorithms (F,R) where F and R are each others in-
verses, making at most polynomially many queries to an inner oracle, such that
they are indistiguishable from a random permutation and its inverse.
The FPCs are then used to show that the existence of quantum one-way func-
tions implies the existence of quantum pseudorandom permutations. In order to
show this, we make use of articles [HMR12, MR14] to show that certain FPCs
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exist for groups, by ordering the group elements. For the sake of generality, we
show that the notion of a Swap-or-Not shuffle on a deck of cards of [HMR12]
may be generalized to hold for arbitrary groups by defining a Scoot-or-Not (SC)
shuffle. For the SC shuffle, we show that the distinguishing probability of an ad-
versary making classical q queries to an r round implementation of the shuffle on
G, is bounded by
8|G|3/2
r + 4
(
q + |G|
2|G|
)r/4+1
.
However, we are not able to generalize the Sometimes-Recurse shuffle of [MR14]
per group theoretic considerations.
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2 Assumptions and General Definitions
Recall the following definition of a group, taken from [DF99].
Definition 9. A group is an ordered pair (G, ·) where G is a set and · is a binary
operation on G satisfying the following axioms:
1. (a · b) · c = a · (b · c), for all a, b, c ∈ G, i.e. · is associative.
2. there exists a unique identity element 1 ∈ G, such that for all a ∈ G, we
have a · 1 = 1 · a = a.
3. for each a ∈ G there exists a unique inverse element a−1 ∈ G such that
a · a−1 = a−1 · a = 1.
The group is called abelian (or commutative) if a · b = b · a for all a, b ∈ G.
In the following, we work in the Random Oracle Model such that we may
assume the existence of a random permutation oracle on group elements. We let
G be the family of all finite groups, e.g. a group G ∈ G is a pair of the set G
and operation · satisfying the group axioms. We also assume that for any group
G ∈ G, |G| ≤ 2poly(n) for some n ∈ N and some polynomial poly(·).
We will need the concept of pseudorandom, which is also called indistinguish-
able from random, in several forms. On notation, we write x ∈R X for an element
chosen uniformly at random from a set X. In the following, we consider the posi-
tive integer λ to be the security parameter, specified in unary per convention. We
assume that for each λ there exists a uniquely specified group G(λ) = Gλ ∈ G
with size |Gλ| ≥ 2λ.
Definition 10. For an adversary A, we write
Pr
x∈RX
[AOx(λ) = 1]
to denote the probability that the adversary outputs 1 as a function of λ in a
standard distinguishability experiment, when given access to the oracle Ox which
relies on the randomness of x.
Definition 11. Let Fm,n : Gλ × Gm → Gn, for Gm, Gn ∈ G, be an efficient,
keyed function. Fm,n is a pseudorandom function (PRF) if for all probabilistic
distinguishers A, limited to only polynomially many queries to the function-oracle,
there exists a negligible function negl(·), such that∣∣∣∣ Prk∈RGλ [AFm,n(k,·)(λ) = 1]− Prpi∈RFGm→Gn [Api(·)(λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ),
where FGm→Gn is the set of functions from Gm to Gn.
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If F : G×G→ G is a pseudorandom function, we say that it is a pseudoran-
dom function on G.
Definition 12. Let P : Gλ × G → G be an efficient, keyed permutation. P is
a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) if for all probabilistic distinguishers A,
limited to only polynomially many queries to the permutation-oracle, there exists
a negligible function negl(·), such that∣∣∣∣ Prk∈RGλ [AP (k,·)(λ) = 1]− Prpi∈RPG→G [Api(·)(λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ),
where PG→G is the set of permutations on G.
Definition 13. Let P : Gλ × G → G be an efficient, keyed permutation. P is
said to be a super pseudorandom permutation (SPRP) if for all probabilistic
distinguishers A, limited to only polynomially many queries to the permutation-
and inverse permutation-oracles, there exists a negligible function negl(·), such
that ∣∣∣∣ Prk∈RGλ [AP (k,·),P−1(k,·)(λ) = 1]− Prpi∈RPG→G [Api(·),pi−1(·)(λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ),
where PG→G is the set of permutations on G.
A (super) pseudorandom permutation P : G×G→ G is said to be a (super)
pseudorandom permutation on G.
7
3 Even-Mansour
We first remark that the results in this section were initially proven in a project
prior to the start of the thesis but were further worked on to complement this
thesis. Thus we have chosen to include parts of it, while this inclusion accounts
for the brevity in certain results. We begin by defining the one-key Even-Mansour
scheme over arbitrary groups, which we will refer to as the Group EM scheme.
Definition 14. We define the Group Even-Mansour scheme to be the triple
of a key generation algorithm, encryption algorithm, and decryption algorithm.
The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ, fixes and
outputs a group G ∈R G with |G| ≥ 2λ, and outputs a key k ∈R G. The encryption
algorithm Ek(m) takes as input the key k and a plaintext m ∈ G and outputs
Ek(m) = P (m · k) · k,
where P is the public permutation. The decryption algorithm Dk(c) takes as input
the key k and a ciphertext c ∈ G and outputs
Dk(c) = P
−1(c · k−1) · k−1,
where P−1 is the inverse public permutation.
This definition satisfies correctness as:
Dk(Ek(m)) = P
−1(P (m · k) · k · k−1) · k−1
= P−1(P (m · k)) · k−1
= m · k · k−1
= m,
and even satisfies Ek(Dk(c)) = c, i.e. it is a permutation.
3.1 Two Forms of Security for the Group EM Scheme
In this subsection, we prove classical results about our new scheme. We do so by
considering Even and Mansour’s two notions of security: the Existential Forgery
Problem and the Cracking Problem, the Cracking Problem being the stronger of
the two.
Definition 15. In the Existential Forgery Problem (EFP), we consider the
following game:
1. A group G ∈ G and a key k ∈R G are generated.
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2. The adversary A gets the security parameter, in unary, and the group G.
3. A receives oracle access to the Ek, Dk, P, and P−1 oracles.
4. A eventually outputs a pair (m, c).
If Ek(m) = c, and (m, c) has not been queried before, we say that A succeeds.
In the Cracking Problem (CP), we consider the following game:
1. A group G ∈ G and a key k ∈R G are generated.
2. The adversary A gets the security parameter, in unary, and the group G.
3. A is presented with Ek(m0) = c0 ∈R G.
4. A receives oracle access to the Ek, Dk, P, and P−1 oracles, but the decryption
oracle outputs ⊥ if A queries c = c0.
5. A outputs a plaintext m.
If Dk(c0) = m, then we say that A succeeds. The success probability is the
probability that on a uniformly random chosen encryption c0 = Ek(m0), A outputs
m0.
Furthermore, Even and Mansour show that polynomial-time EFP security in-
fers polynomial-time CP security. There are no limiting factors prohibiting the
problems and inference result from being employed on groups. In fact, there is
nothing disallowing the use of the same proof of the EFP security for the EFP
security of the one-key EM scheme, as noted in [DKS12], which we therefore omit.
Indeed, by redefining notions in the [EM97] proof to take into account that we are
working over a not necessarily abelian group, we are able to prove that the Group
EM scheme satisfies the EFP notion of security, specifically the following.
Theorem 16. Assume P ∈R PG→G and let the key k ∈R G. For any probabilistic
adversary A, the success probability of solving the EFP is bounded by
Succ(A) = Prk,P [EFP (A) = 1] = O
(
st
|G|
)
,
where s is the number of E/D-queries and t is the number of P/P−1-queries, i.e.
the success probability is negligible.
By the Even and Mansour inference result, we get the corollary below.
Corollary 17. Assume P ∈R PG→G and let the key k ∈R G. For any probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A, the success probability of solving the Cracking
Problem is negligible.
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As Even and Mansour also note, the above results may be extended to instances
where the permutation is a pseudorandom permutation by a simple reduction.
Hence, we get the following two results.
Theorem 18. Assume P is a pseudorandom permutation on G ∈ G and let the key
k ∈R G. For any probabilistic adversary A with only polynomially many queries
to its oracles, the success probability of solving the Existential Forgery Problem is
negligible.
Corollary 19. Assume P is a pseudorandom permutation on G ∈ G and let the
key k ∈R G. For any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A, the success
probability of solving the Cracking Problem is negligible.
3.2 Pseudorandomness Property of the Group EM Scheme
Although the above notions of security are strong, we are more interested in any
pseudorandomness property the Group EM scheme offers us. Kilian and Rogaway
[KR01] show that the one-key EM scheme satisfies the pseudorandom permutation
property, i.e. with only an encryption oracle and the permutation oracles, the EM
scheme is indistinguishable from random to any adversary with only polynomially
many queries to its oracles. We note that they only show the pseudorandomness
property, but state in their discussion section that their proof may be adapted
to include a decryption oracle, i.e. that the one-key EM scheme satisfies the
super pseudorandom permutation property. Having done the analysis with the
decryption oracle, over an arbitrary group, we concur. However, we were also
able to generalize the [KR01] proof to a one-key construction. This not entirely
remarkable as the key k will usually be different from its group inverse, hence we
were able to use the same proof, but with adjustments to the games and their
analysis.
In the following, we assume that the adversary A is unbounded computation-
ally, but may only make polynomially many queries to the E/D- and P/P−1-
oracles, where all oracles act as black boxes and P is a truly random permutation.
We intend to play the "pseudorandom or random permutation game": A is given
an encryption oracle E (with related decryption oracle D) which is randomly cho-
sen with equal probability from the following two options:
1. A random key k ∈R G is chosen uniformly and used to encrypt as E(m) =
Ek(m) = P (m · k) · k, or
2. A random permutation pi ∈R PG→G is chosen and used to encrypt as E(m) =
pi(m).
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The adversary wins the game if it can distinguish how E was chosen, with proba-
bility significantly better than 1/2. More explicitly, we wish to prove the following
for the group Even-Mansour scheme.
Theorem 20. Assume P ∈R PG→G and let the key k ∈R G. For any probabilistic
adversary A, limited to polynomially many E/D- and P/P−1-oracle queries, the
adversarial advantage of A is bounded by
Adv(A) def=
∣∣∣Pr [AP,P−1Ek,Dk = 1]− Pr [AP,P−1pi,pi−1 = 1]∣∣∣ = O( st|G|
)
. (1)
where s is the total number of E/D-queries and t is the total number of P/P−1-
queries, i.e. the success probability is negligible.
Proof. We may assume that A is deterministic (in essence, being unbounded com-
putationally affords A the possibility of derandomizing its strategy by searching
all its possible random choices and picking the most effective choices after having
computed the effectiveness of each choice. For an example, see [DR02].) We may
also assume that A never queries a pair in Ss or Tt more than once, where Si
and Ti are the sets of i E/D- and P/P−1-queries, respectively. Let us define two
main games, that A could play, through oracle interactions (see next page for the
explicit game descriptions.)
Note that the steps in italics have no impact on the response to A’s queries,
we simply continue to answer the queries and only note if the key turns bad, i.e.
we say that a key k is bad w.r.t. the sets Ss and Tt if there exist i, j such that
either mi · k = xj or ci · k−1 = yj, and k is good otherwise. There are at most 2st|G|
bad keys.
Game R: We consider the random game which corresponds to the latter prob-
ability in (1), i.e.
PR := Pr
[
AP,P−1pi,pi−1 = 1
]
.
From the definition of Game R, we see that, letting PrR denote the probability
when playing Game R,
PrR
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1
]
= PR, (2)
as we are simply giving uniformly random answers to each of A’s queries.
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Notation: We let S1i = {m|(m, c) ∈ Si}, S2i = {c|(m, c) ∈ Si}, T 1i = {x|(x, y) ∈ Ti}, and
T 2i = {y|(x, y) ∈ Ti}.
GAME R: Initially, let S0 and T0 be
empty and flag unset. Choose k ∈R G,
then answer the i + 1’st query as follows:
E-oracle query with mi+1:
1. Choose ci+1 ∈R G \ S2i .
2. If P (mi+1 · k) ∈ T 2i , or
P−1(ci+1 · k−1) ∈ T 1i , then set flag
to bad.
3. Define E(mi+1) = ci+1 (and thereby
also D(ci+1) = mi+1) and return ci+1.
D-oracle query with ci+1:
1. Choose mi+1 ∈R G \ S1i .
2. If P−1(ci+1 · k−1) ∈ T 1i , or
P (mi+1 · k) ∈ T 2i , then set flag to
bad.
3. Define D(ci+1) = mi+1 (and thereby
also E(mi+1) = ci+1) and return mi+1.
P -oracle query with xi+1:
1. Choose yi+1 ∈R G \ T 2i .
2. If E(xi+1 · k−1) ∈ S2i , or
D(yi+1 · k) ∈ S1i , then set flag to
bad.
3. Define P (xi+1) = yi+1 (and thereby
also P−1(yi+1) = xi+1) and return yi+1.
P−1-oracle query with yi+1:
1. Choose xi+1 ∈R G \ T 1i .
2. If D(yi+1 · k) ∈ S1i , or E(xi+1 · k−1) ∈
S2i , then set flag to bad.
3. Define P−1(yi+1) = xi+1 (and thereby
also P (xi+1) = yi+1) and return xi+1.
GAME X: Initially, let S0 and T0 be
empty and flag unset. Choose k ∈R G,
then answer the i + 1’st query as follows:
E-oracle query with mi+1:
1. Choose ci+1 ∈R G \ S2i .
2. If P (mi+1 · k) ∈ T 2i then redefine
ci+1 := P (mi+1 · k) · k and set flag to bad.
Else if P−1(ci+1 · k−1) ∈ T 1i , then set flag
to bad and goto Step 1.
3. Define E(mi+1) = ci+1 (and thereby
also D(ci+1) = mi+1) and return ci+1.
D-oracle query with ci+1:
1. Choose mi+1 ∈R G \ S1i .
2. If P−1(ci+1 · k−1) ∈ T 1i then redefine
mi+1 := P
−1(ci+1 · k−1) · k−1 and set flag
to bad. Else if P (mi+1 · k) ∈ T 2i , then set
flag to bad and goto Step 1.
3. Define D(ci+1) = mi+1 (and thereby
also E(mi+1) = ci+1) and return mi+1.
P -oracle query with xi+1:
1. Choose yi+1 ∈R G \ T 2i .
2. If E(xi+1 · k−1) ∈ S2i then redefine
yi+1 := E(xi+1 · k−1) · k−1 and set flag to
bad. Else if D(yi+1 · k) ∈ S1i , then set flag
to bad and goto Step 1.
3. Define P (xi+1) = yi+1 (and thereby
also P−1(yi+1) = xi+1) and return yi+1.
P−1-oracle query with yi+1:
1. Choose xi+1 ∈R G \ T 1i .
2. If D(yi+1 ·k) ∈ S1i then redefine xi+1 :=
D(yi+1 · k) · k and set flag to bad. Else if
E(xi+1 · k−1) ∈ S2i , then set flag to bad
and goto Step 1.
3. Define P−1(yi+1) = xi+1 (and thereby
also P (xi+1) = yi+1) and return xi+1.
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Game X: Consider the experiment which corresponds to the game played in
the prior probability in (1) and define this probability as
PX := Pr
[
AP,P−1Ek,Dk = 1
]
.
We define Game X, as outlined above. Note that again the parts in italics have
no impact on the response to A’s queries, however, this time, when a key becomes
bad, we choose a new random value repeatedly for the response until the key is
no longer bad, and then reply with this value. Intuitively, Game X behaves like
Game R except thatGame X checks for consistency as it does not want A to win
on some collision. It is non-trivial to see that, letting PrX denote the probability
when playing Game X,
PrX
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1
]
= PX . (3)
The proof is given in Appendix A.
We have defined both games in such a way that their outcomes differ only in
the event that a key turns bad. Thus, any circumstance which causes a difference
in the instructions carried out by the games, will also cause both games to set the
flag to bad. Let BAD denote the event that the flag gets set to bad and the case
that the flag is not set to bad by ¬BAD, then the two following lemmas follow
from the previous statement.
Lemma 21. PrR [BAD] = PrX [BAD] and PrR [¬BAD] = PrX [¬BAD].
Lemma 22. PrR
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|¬BAD
]
= PrX
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|¬BAD
]
.
Using these two lemmas we are able to prove the lemma:
Lemma 23. Adv(A) ≤ PrR [BAD].
This is because, using (2), (3), and lemmas 21 and 22,
Adv(A) = |PX − PR|
=
∣∣∣PrX [AP,P−1E,D = 1]− PrR [AP,P−1E,D = 1]∣∣∣
= |PrX
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|¬BAD
]
· PrX [¬BAD]
+ PrX
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|BAD
]
· PrX [BAD]
− PrR
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|¬BAD
]
· PrR [¬BAD]
− PrR
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1|BAD
]
· PrR [BAD] |
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=
∣∣∣PrR [BAD] · (PrX [AP,P−1E,D = 1|BAD]− PrR [AP,P−1E,D = 1|BAD])∣∣∣
≤ PrR [BAD] .
Let us now define yet another game, Game R’.
GAME R’: Initially, let S0 and T0 be empty and
flag unset. Answer the i + 1’st query as follows:
E-oracle query with mi+1:
1. Choose ci+1 ∈R G \ S2i .
2. Define E(mi+1) := ci+1 (and thereby also D(ci+1) := mi+1) and return ci+1.
D-oracle query with ci+1:
1. Choose mi+1 ∈R G \ S1i .
2. Define D(ci+1) := mi+1 (and thereby also E(mi+1) := ci+1) and return mi+1.
P -oracle query with xi+1:
1. Choose yi+1 ∈R G \ T 2i .
2. Define P (xi+1) := yi+1 (and thereby also P−1(yi+1) := xi+1) and return yi+1.
P−1-oracle query with yi+1:
1. Choose xi+1 ∈R G \ T 1i .
2. Define P−1(yi+1) := xi+1 (and thereby also P (xi+1) := yi+1) and return xi+1.
After all queries have been answered, choose k ∈R G. If there exists (m, c) ∈ Ss and
(x, y) ∈ Tt such that k becomes bad then set flag to bad.
This game runs asGame R except that it does not choose a key until all of the
queries have been answered and then checks for badness of the flag (by checking
whether or not the key has become bad). It can be shown that the flag is set to bad
in Game R if and only if the flag is set to bad in Game R’ (by a consideration
of cases (see Appendix B.)) Hence, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 24. PrR [BAD] = PrR′ [BAD].
Using the above lemma, we now only have to bound PrR′ [BAD] in order to
bound Adv(A), but as the adversary queries at most s elements to the E/D-oracles
and at most t elements to the P/P−1-oracles, and the key k is chosen uniformly
at random from G, we have that the probability of choosing a bad key is at most
2st/|G|, i.e.
Adv(A) ≤ PrR′ [BAD] = O
(
st
|G|
)
.

Restating the theorem, we get our second main result:
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Theorem 25. For any probabilistic adversary A, limited to polynomially many
E/D- and P/P−1-oracle queries, the Group EM scheme over a group G is a super
pseudorandom permutation.
By removing the decryption oracle, we get the following corollary:
Corollary 26. For any probabilistic adversary A, limited to polynomially many
E- and P/P−1-oracle queries, the Group EM scheme over a group G is a pseudo-
random permutation.
Remark. We see that in the group ((Z/2Z)n,⊕), our Group EM scheme reduces
to the one-key EM scheme given in [DKS12]. The proof given in [DKS12] proves
the security of the scheme, and the proof given in [KR01] proves the pseudoran-
domness, equivalently to our claims.
It can be proven that a multiple round Group EM scheme is an SPRP because
the security only depends on the last round, which is also an SPRP.
3.3 Slide Attack
We would like to show that the security bound that we have found above is optimal,
so we slightly alter the simple optimal attack on the Single-Key Even-Mansour
cipher as constructed in [DKS12]. The original version works for abelian groups
with few adjustments and [DKS12] also present another slide attack against a
modular addition DESX construction.
Consider the one-key Group Even-Mansour cipher
E(x) = P (x · k) · k,
over a group G with binary operation ·, where P is a publicly available permutation
oracle, x ∈ G, and k ∈R G. Define the following values:
x = x, y = x · k, z = P (y), w = E(x) = P (x · k) · k.
We hereby have that w · y−1 = z · x−1. Consider the attack which follows.
1. For d =
√|G| arbitrary values xi ∈ G, i = 1, . . . , d, and d arbitrary values
yi ∈ G, i = 1, . . . , d, query the E-oracle on the xi’s and the P -oracle on the
yi’s. Store the values in a hash table as
(E(xi) · y−1i , P (yi) · x−1i , i),
sorted by the first coordinate.
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2. If there exists a match in the above step, i.e. E(xi) · y−1i = P (yi) · x−1i for
some i, check the guess that k = x−1i · yi.
It can be seen by the Birthday Problem1, that with non-negligible probability,
there must exist a slid pair (xi, yi) satisfying the above property, i.e. there exists
1 ≤ i ≤ d such that k = x−1i · yi. For a random pair (x, y) ∈ G2 it holds that
E(x) = P (y) · x−1 · y with probability |G|−1, so we expect few, if any, collisions
in the hash table, including the collision by the slid pair where the correct key k
is found. The data complexity of the attack is d E-oracle queries and d P -oracle
queries. Hence the attack bound d2 = |G|, which matches the lower bound given in
Theorem 16 and Theorem 20. We have therefore found that our scheme is optimal.
1Considering the approximation p(n) ≈ n22m , where p(n) is the probability of there being a
Birthday Problem collision from n randomly chosen elements from the set of m elements, then
p(
√|G|) ≈ √|G|22|G| = 1/2.
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4 Feistel
We now consider the Feistel cipher over arbitrary groups, which we will call the
Group Feistel cipher. The following is a complement to [PRS02] who treat the
Group Feistel cipher construction with great detail. Our main accomplishment in
this section is the settling of an open problem posed by them.
4.1 Definitions
We define a Feistel cipher over a group (G, ·) as a series of round functions on
elements of G×G = G2.
Definition 27. Given an efficiently computable but not necessarily invertible func-
tion f : G→ G, called a round function, we define the 1-round Group Feistel
cipher Ff to be
Ff : G×G −→ G×G,
(x, y) 7−→ (y, x · f(y)).
In the case where we have multiple rounds, we index the round functions as fi,
and denote the r-round Group Feistel cipher by Ff1,...,fr . We concurrently
denote the input to the i’th round by (Li−1, Ri−1) and having the output (Li, Ri) =
(Ri−1, Li−1 · fi(Ri−1)), where Li and Ri respectively denote the left and right parts
of the i’th output.
Note that if (Li, Ri) is the i’th round output, we may invert the i’th round by
setting Ri−1 := Li and then computing Li−1 := Ri ·(fi(Ri−1))−1 to get (Li−1, Ri−1).
As this holds for all rounds, regardless of the invertibility of the round functions,
we get that an r-round Feistel cipher is invertible for all r.
Let F : Gλ × G → G be a pseudorandom function. We define the keyed
permutation F (r) as
F
(r)
k1,...,kr
(x, y)
def
= FFk1 ,...,Fkr (x, y).
We sometimes index the keys as 1, 2, . . . , r, or omit the key index entirely.
4.2 Results
For completeness, we show some of the preliminary results for Group Feistel ci-
phers, not considered in [PRS02].
We first note that F (1) is not a pseudorandom permutation as
F
(1)
k1
(L0, R0) = (L1, R1) = (R0, L0 · Fk1(R0)),
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Figure 2: Encryption schemes.
such that any distinguisher A need only compare R0 to L1.
Also F (2) is not a pseudorandom permutation: Consider a pseudorandom func-
tion F on G. Pick k1, k2 ∈R Gλ. Distinguisher A sets (L0, R0) = (1, g) for some
g ∈ G, where 1 is the identity element of G, then queries (L0, R0) to its oracle and
receives,
L2 = L0 · Fk1(R0) = Fk1(g) and R2 = R0 · Fk2(L0 · Fk1(R0)) = g · Fk2(Fk1(g)).
On its second query, the distinguisher A lets L0 ∈ G \ 1 but R0 = g, such that it
receives
L2 = L0 · Fk1(R0) = L0 · Fk1(g) and R2 = g · Fk2(L0 · Fk1(g)).
AsAmay find the inverse to elements in G, A acquires (Fk1(g))−1, and by so doing,
may compute L2 · (Fk1(g))−1 = L0. If F (2) were random, this would only occur
negligibly many times, while A may query its permutation-oracle polynomially
many times such that if L0 is retrieved non-negligibly many times out of the
queries, A is able to distinguish between a random permutation and F (2) with
non-negligible probability.
As one would expect, the 3-round Group Feistel cipher (see Figure 1a) is indeed
a pseudorandom permutation. The following proof is based on the proof given in
Katz and Lindell [KL15] of the analogous result for bit strings with XOR.
2TikZ figure adapted from [Jea16].
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Theorem 28. If F is a pseudorandom function on G, then F (3) is a pseudorandom
permutation on G.
Proof. Assume we have chosen uniform keys k1, k2, k3 ∈ G. We replace our pseu-
dorandom functions in F (3) by random functions fi for i = 1, 2, 3, which we may by
a standard argument: Simply consider an adversary using such a distinguisher as
a subroutine. The adversary has an oracle-triple of either three random functions
or three independently keyed pseudorandom functions and the reduction easily
follows.
Let us continue our proof by letting A be a probabilistic distinguisher with
only polynomially many queries to its permutation-oracle, which is either F (3) or
pi ∈R PG2→G2 , with equal probability. We wish to show that∣∣∣∣ Prf1,f2,f3∈RFG→G [AFf1,f2,f3 (·)(n) = 1]− Prpi∈RPG2→G2 [Api(·)(n) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ,
is negligible over uniform and independent choices of random functions f1, f2, and
f3 in FG→G, where the n ∈ N denotes the security parameter (written in unary,
which decides the choice of G.) We assume that q(n) = q is the polynomial bound
on the permutation-oracle, O, queries that A petitions and let Q = {1, . . . , q}.
We may assume that A never queries the same pair to the O-oracle twice. We let
(Li0, R
i
0), (L
i
1, R
i
1), (L
i
2, R
i
2), and (Li3, Ri3) denote the respectively 0th, 1st, 2nd, and
3rd intermediate values of the ith query. In this notation, A only ever sees the
corresponding (Li0, Ri0) and (Li3, Ri3) pairs of values upon oracle query. We wish
to prove that the Feistel cipher is collision-free, such that the distinguisher cannot
win on there being a collision.
Collision at R1: If Ri1 = R
j
1 for some i 6= j ∈ Q, we say that there is a
collision at R1. We now consider when such a collision might occur. Assume there
exist fixed, distinct i, j ≤ q such that Ri0 = Rj0, then, as we assumed A does not
query the same pair twice, Li0 6= Lj0, such that
Ri1 = L
i
0 · f1(Ri0) 6= Lj0 · f1(Rj0) = Rj1,
i.e. there is no collision at R1. If instead Ri0 6= Rj0, then f1(Ri0) and f1(Rj0) are
uniformly distributed and independent, as we assumed that f1 was random, and
so
Pr
[
Li0 · f1(Ri0) = Lj0 · f1(Rj0)
]
= Pr
[
f1(R
j
0) = (L
j
0)
−1 · Li0 · f1(Ri0)
]
=
1
|G| .
By the union bound over the q values of i and q values of j for distinct i, j ∈ Q,
we have that,
Pr [ Collision at R1] ≤ q2/|G|,
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which, for large enough |G|, is negligible.
Collision at R2: As with the case of R1, if Ri2 = R
j
2 for some i 6= j ∈ Q, we
say that there is a collision at R2. Obviously, if we condition a collision at R2 by
a collision at R1, then the probability of a collision at R2 must be negligible as a
collision at R1 is negligible. Let us therefore condition a collision at R2 on there
being no collision at R1, we wish to prove that also this probability is negligible.
Consider again fixed and distinct i, j ∈ Q. By the assumption of no collision at
R1, we have Ri1 6= Rj1. Hence f2(Ri1) and f2(Rj1) are uniformly distributed and
independent because we assumed that f2 was random. Furthermore, f1 and f2 are
independent, so one easily sees that
Pr
[
Li1 · f2(Ri1) = Lj1 · f2(Rj1) | No collision at R1
]
=
1
|G| , (4)
such that again, by taking the union bound over all distinct i, j ∈ Q,
Pr [ Collision at R2 | No collision at R1] ≤ q2/|G|,
which, for large enough |G|, is negligible.
Now, conditioned on there being no collision at R1, for all distinct i, j ∈ Q,
we have that Li3 = Ri2 = Li1 · f2(Ri1) is independent of Lj3, and uniformly dis-
tributed in G (see (4)). Additionally, conditioning on there being no collision at
R2, we get that L13, . . . , L
q
3 are uniformly distributed among all sequences of dis-
tinct values in G. Again conditioned on there being no collision at R2 and using
that Li2 is independent of Li3 and that f3 is random and independent over uniform
and independent input, we similarly see that for Ri3 = Li2 · f3(Ri2), the q values
R13, . . . , R
q
3 are uniformly distributed in G and independent of each other, as well
as independent of the L13, . . . , L
q
3.
So, when querying the F (3) instantiated O-oracle (with uniform and indepen-
dent round functions) with q distinct inputs, the outputs (L13, R13), . . . , (L
q
3, R
q
3)
are, except with negligible probability, distributed such that the {Li3} are uniform
and independent elements of G and also the {Ri3} are uniform and independent el-
ements of G. However, if the O-oracle is instantiated with a random permutation,
the outputs (L13, R13), . . . , (L
q
3, R
q
3) are uniform and independent elements of G×G.
Hence, the distinguisher’s best attack would be to guess that the O-oracle is a
random permutation if there exist distinct i, j ∈ Q such that Li3 = Lj3, which only
occurs with negligible probability. Specifically, for a 3-round Feistel network, F (3),
using uniform and independent round functions, there exists a negligible function
negl1(·), such that
Pr
F (3)
[
(Li3, R
i
3) = (L
j
3, R
j
3)|i 6= j ∈ Q
] ≤ negl1(n),
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for large enough n, and for a random permutation pi, there exists a negligible
function negl2(·), such that
Pr
pi
[
(Li3, R
i
3) = (L
j
3, R
j
3)|i 6= j ∈ Q
]
=
q · (q − 1)
|G| ≤ negl2(n),
for large enough n. But then, there exists a negligible function negl(·), such that∣∣∣PrF [(Li3, Ri3) = (Lj3, Rj3)|i 6= j ∈ Q]− Prpi [(Li3, Ri3) = (Lj3, Rj3)|i 6= j ∈ Q]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n),
for large enough n. As any collision based attack will not give the distinguisher a
non-negligible advantage F (3) must be a pseudorandom permutation. 
Among the considerations in [PRS02], they showed that the 3-round Feistel ci-
pher over abelian groups was not super pseudorandom, but left as an open problem
a proof over non-abelian groups. We present such a proof now.
Proposition 29. The 3-round Group Feistel cipher is not super pseudorandom.
Proof. The proof is a counter-example using the following procedure:
1. Choose two oracle-query pairs inG×G: (L0, R0) and (L′0, R0) where L0 6= L′0.
2. Query the encryption oracle to get (L3, R3) and (L′3, R′3).
3. Query (L′′3, R′′3) = (L′3, L0 · (L′0)−1 ·R′3) to the decryption oracle.
4. If R′′0 = L′3 · (L3)−1 ·R0, guess that the oracle is F (3), else guess random.
For F (3), this algorithm succeeds with probability 1. For a random permutation,
this algorithm succeeds negligibly often.
Explicitly, assume the O-oracle is instantiated using F (3) with the three pseu-
dorandom functions F1, F2, F3. If we choose the two O-oracle query pairs in G×G:
(L0, R0) and (L′0, R′0) = (L′0, R0) where L0 6= L′0, then we get that
(L0, R0)
O7−→ (L3, R3) = (R0 · F2(L0 · F1(R0)), L0 · F1(R0) · F3(L3))
(L′0, R0)
O7−→ (L′3, R′3) = (R0 · F2(L′0 · F1(R0)), L′0 · F1(R0) · F3(L′3)).
Take the O−1-oracle query pair in G×G:
(L′′3, R
′′
3) = (L
′
3, L0 · (L′0)−1 ·R′3),
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which is different from L′3, R′3 as L0 6= L′0 such that L0 · (L′0)−1 6= 1. We then get
the following by following the steps of the O−1-oracle.
L′′3 := L
′
3 = R0 · F2(L′0 · F1(R0)),
R′′3 := L0 · (L′0)−1 ·R′3
= L0 · (L′0)−1 · L′0 · F1(R0) · F3(L′3),
= L0 · F1(R0) · F3(L′3).
As R′′2 := L′′3 = L′3 and L′′2 := R′′3 · (F3(R′′2))−1, we get that
L′′2 := R
′′
3 · (F3(R′′2))−1
= L0 · F1(R0) · F3(L′3) · (F3(L′3))−1
= L0 · F1(R0).
Using that L′′1 := R′′2 · (F2(R′′1))−1, R′′2 = L′3, and R′′1 := L′′2, we get that
L′′1 := R
′′
2 · (F2(R′′1))−1
= L′3 · (F2(L0 · F1(R0)))−1
= R0 · F2(L′0 · F1(R0)) · (F2(L0 · F1(R0)))−1.
Using that R0 is known such that we may find its inverse, we hereby get that
R′′0 := L
′′
1 = R0 · F2(L′0 · F1(R0)) · (F2(L0 · F1(R0)))−1
= R0 · F2(L′0 · F1(R0)) · (F2(L0 · F1(R0)))−1 ·R−10 ·R0
= R0 · F2(L′0 · F1(R0)) · (R0 · F2(L0 · F1(R0)))−1 ·R0
= L′3 · (L3)−1 ·R0.
The elements L′3, L3, and R0 are all known values, and so, by querying the O-
oracle and its inverse oracle with the above queries, we may determine R′′0 with
probability 1 if the oracle is the Feistel network, and with negligible probability if
the inverse oracle were random. Hence, we have demonstrated an attack on F (3)
such that it cannot be a super pseudorandom permutation over any group G. 
For super pseudorandomness of the 4-round Group Feistel cipher, we refer the
reader to [PRS02]. In the paper, they show a strong result using certain hash
functions as round functions, from which the following is a corollary.
Corollary 30. Let G be a group, with characteristic other than 2, and let f, g :
Gλ×G→ G be pseudorandom functions. Then, for any adversary A with polyno-
mially many queries to its E/D-oracles, the family P of permutations on G × G
consisting of permutations of the form F (4) = Fg,f,f,g are indistinguishable from
random, i.e. super pseudorandom permutations (SPRPs).
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5 Implementing the Group Even-Mansour Scheme
Now that we have shown that both the Even-Mansour scheme and the Feistel
cipher are generalizable to arbitrary groups, we might consider how to implement
one given the other. Gentry and Ramzan [GR04] considered exactly this for the
two-key EM scheme over (Z/2Z)n. However, their paper only had sketches of
proofs and refer to another edition of the paper for full details. As we are unable
to find a copy in the place that they specify it to exist, and as we generalize their
result non-trivially, we have decided to fill in the details while generalizing their
proof.
In this section, we consider a generalized version of the Gentry and Ramzan
[GR04] construction, namely, the Group Even-Mansour scheme on G2 instantiated
with a 4-round Group Feistel cipher as the public permutation:
Ψf,gk (x) = Fg,f,f,g(x · k) · k,
where k = (kL, kR) ∈ G2 is a key consisting of two subkeys, chosen independently
and uniformly at random, and f and g are round functions on G, modelled as
random function oracles, available to all parties, including the adversary. We
consider the operation x · k for x = (xL, xR) ∈ G2, to be the coordinate-wise
group operation, but do not otherwise discern between it and the group operation
· on elements of G. In the following, we shall follow the proof in [GR04] closely.
However, we make quite a few modifications, mostly due to the nature of our
generalization. Note that we consider a one-key scheme, as opposed to the two-
key version in [GR04] (see Figure 1b.) Our main theorem for this section is the
following.
Theorem 31. Let f, g be modelled as random oracles and let the subkeys of k =
(kL, kR) ∈ G2 be chosen independently and uniformly at random. Let Ψf,gk (x) =
Fg,f,f,g(x · k) · k, and let R ∈R PG2→G2. Then, for any probabilistic 4-oracle
adversary A with at most
• qc queries to Ψ and Ψ−1 (or R and R−1),
• qf queries to f , and
• qg queries to g,
we have∣∣∣Pr [AΨ,Ψ−1,f,g = 1]− Pr [AR,R−1,f,g = 1]∣∣∣
≤ (2q2c + 4qfqc + 4qgqc + q2c − qc)|G|−1 + 2 ·
(
qc
2
)
(2|G|−1 + |G|−2).
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5.1 Definitions
Before we can begin the proof, we will need several definitions all of which are
identical to the [GR04] definitions, up to rewording.
Definition 32. Let P denote the permutation oracle (either Ψ or R), Of and
Og the f and g oracles, respectively. We get the transcripts: TP , the set of all P
queries, Tf , the set of all f queries, and Tg, the set of all g queries, i.e. the sets
TP = {〈x1, y1〉, 〈x2, y2〉, · · · , 〈xqc , yqc〉}P ,
Tf = {〈x′1, y′1〉, 〈x′2, y′2〉, · · · , 〈x′qf , y′qf 〉}f ,
Tg = {〈x′′1, y′′1〉, 〈x′′2, y′′2〉, · · · , 〈x′′qg , y′′qg〉}g.
We discern between two types of oracle queries: Cipher queries (+, x) = P (x) and
(−, y) = P−1(y); Oracle queries (Of , x′) and (Og, x′′), respectively f - and g-oracle
queries.
As we have no bounds on the computational complexity of the adversary A,
we may assume that A is deterministic, as we did in the proof of Theorem 20.
Hence, we may consider an algorithm CA which, given a set of A’s queries, can
determine A’s next query.
Definition 33. For 0 ≤ i ≤ qc, 0 ≤ j ≤ qf , and 0 ≤ k ≤ qg, the i + j + k + 1’st
query by A is
CA
[{〈x1, y1〉, . . . , 〈xi, yi〉}P , {〈x′1, y′1〉, . . . , 〈x′j, y′j〉}f , {〈x′′1, y′′1〉, . . . , 〈x′′k, y′′k〉}g]
where the upper equality case on the indexes is defined to be A’s final output.
Definition 34. Let σ = (TP , Tf , Tg) be a tuple of transcripts with length qc, qf , qg,
respectively. We say that σ is a possible A-transcript if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤
j ≤ qf , and 1 ≤ k ≤ qg,
CA
[{〈x1, y1〉, . . . , 〈xi, yi〉}P , {〈x′1, y′1〉, . . . , 〈x′j, y′j〉}f , {〈x′′1, y′′1〉, . . . , 〈x′′k, y′′k〉}g]
∈ {(+, xi+1), (−, yi+1), (Of , x′j+1), (Og, x′′k+1)}.
Let us define two useful ways in which we may answer A’s queries other than
what we have already defined.
Definition 35. Let Ψ˜ be the process where the Ψ- and Ψ−1 cipher query oracles
use f and g, and Of uses f , but Og is replaced by Oh for another, independent,
random function h.
Definition 36. Let R˜ denote the process which answers all oracle queries using f
and g, but answers the i’th cipher query as follows.
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1. If A queries (+, xi) and there exists 1 ≤ j < i, such that the j’th query-
answer pair has xj = xi, return yi := yj.
2. If A queries (−, yi) and there exists 1 ≤ j < i, such that the j’th query-
answer pair has yj = yi, return xi := xj.
3. Otherwise, return uniformly chosen element in G2.
The latter definition may not be consistent with any function or permutation,
so we formalize exactly this event.
Definition 37. Let TP be a possible A-cipher-transcript. TP is inconsistent if
for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc there exist cipher-pairs such that either
• xi = xj but yi 6= yj, or
• xi 6= xj but yi = yj.
Any σ containing such a transcript TP is called inconsistent.
Note. Assume from now on that A never repeats any part of a query if the answer
can be determined from previous queries, i.e. every possible A-transcript σ is
consistent such that if i 6= j, then xi 6= xj, yi 6= yj, x′i 6= x′j, and x′′i 6= x′′j .
Note. Let TΨ, TΨ˜, TR˜, TR denote the transcripts seen by A when its cipher queries
are answered by Ψ, Ψ˜, R˜, R, respectively, and oracle queries by Of and Og (noting
that in the case of Ψ˜, the function in the Og has been replaced by another random
function, h.) We also note that using this notation, we have that AΨ,Ψ−1,f,g =
CA(TΨ) (and likewise for Ψ˜, R˜, and R.)
5.2 Lemmas
Now, let us begin finding results that will aid us in proving our main theorem.
First, we will compare the distributions of R˜ and R, using a result by Naor-
Reingold3. Afterwards, we shall consider when the distributions of Ψ and Ψ˜ are
equal. Lastly, we shall consider when the distributions of Ψ˜ and R˜ are equal.
Combining these results will allow us to prove our main theorem.
We remark that whenever we write k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2, we mean that the
subkeys are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
Lemma 38.
∣∣∣∣Pr
R˜
[CA(TR˜) = 1]− Pr
R
[CA(TR) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (qc2
)
· |G|−2.
3The proof of the proposition follows the argument of Proposition 3.3 in [NR99].
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Proof. Let σ be a possible and consistent A-transcript, then
Pr
R
[TR = σ] =
(|G|2
qc
)
= Pr
R˜
[TR˜ = σ | TR˜ is consistent] ,
simply because the only difference between TR and TR˜ is in the cipher queries, and
when TR˜ is consistent, we have no overlap on the query-answer pairs, hence we need
only consider how to choose qc elements from |G|2 many possible elements, without
replacement. Let us now consider the probability of TR˜ being inconsistent. If TR˜ is
inconsistent for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc then either xi = xj and yi 6= yj, or xi 6= xj and
yi = yj. For any given i, j, this happens with at most probability |G|−2, because if
xi = xj is queried, then the R˜-oracle would return the corresponding yi = yj, but
if xi 6= xj is queried, then the R˜-oracle would return a uniformly random element
(and likewise if yi = yj or yi 6= yj were queried to the inverse R˜-oracle.) Hence,
Pr
R˜
[TR˜ is inconsistent] ≤
(
qc
2
)
· |G|−2.
We thereby get that,∣∣∣∣Pr
R˜
[CA(TR˜) = 1]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣Pr
R˜
[CA(TR˜) = 1|TR˜ is consistent]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ · Pr
R˜
[TR˜ is consistent]
+
∣∣∣∣Pr
R˜
[CA(TR˜) = 1|TR˜ is inconsistent]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ · Pr
R˜
[TR˜ is inconsistent]
≤ Pr
R˜
[TR˜ is inconsistent]
≤
(
qc
2
)
· |G|−2,
as the distribution over R is independent of the (in)consistency of TR˜. 
Let us now focus on the distributions of TΨ and TΨ˜, to show that they are
identical unless the input to g in the cipher query to Ψ is equal to the oracle input
to h in Oh. In order to do so, we first define the event BadG(k).
Definition 39. For every specific key k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2, we define BadG(k) to
be the set of all possible and consistent A-transcripts σ, satisfying at least one of
the following:
BG1: ∃i, j, 1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤ qg, such that xRi · kR = x′′j , or
BG2: ∃i, j, 1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤ qg, such that yLi · (kL)−1 = x′′j .
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Lemma 40. Let k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2. For any possible and consistent A-transcript
σ = (TP , Tf , Tg), we have
Pr
k
[σ ∈ BadG(k)] ≤ 2qgqc|G| .
Proof. We know that σ ∈ BadG(k) if one of BG1 or BG2 occur, hence, using the
union bound,
Pr
k
[σ ∈ BadG(k)] = Pr
k
[BG1 occurs ∨BG2 occurs |σ]
≤ Pr
k
[BG1 occurs |σ] + Pr
k
[BG2 occurs |σ]
≤ qgqc · |G|−1 + qgqc · |G|−1
= 2qgqc · |G|−1.

Lemma 41. Let σ be a possible and consistent A-transcript, then
Pr
Ψ
[TΨ = σ|σ 6∈ BadG(k)] = Pr
Ψ˜
[TΨ˜ = σ] .
Proof. We want to show that the query answers in the subtranscripts of the games
Ψ and Ψ˜ are equally distributed, under the condition that neither of the events
BG1 nor BG2 occur in game Ψ. Fix the key k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2. Recall that the
adversary does not query an oracle if it can determine the answer from previous
queries.
In both games, for anyOf -oracle query x′ ∈ G, the query answer will be equally
distributed in both games as the underlying random function f is the same in both
games.
In game Ψ, an Og-oracle query, x′′ ∈ G, will have a uniformly random answer
as g is a random function. Likewise, in game Ψ˜, an Og-oracle query, x′′ ∈ G, will
have a uniformly random answer as h is a random function.
Consider now the permutation oracle P = Fg,f,f,g(x · k) · k. We consider a
query-answer pair 〈x, y〉 ∈ TP for x, y ∈ G2.
In both games, xR · kR will be the input to the first round function, which is g.
In game Ψ˜ the output is always a uniformly random element, newly selected by g.
In game Ψ, if xR · kR has already been queried to the Og-oracle, the output of the
round function is the corresponding oracle answer, else it is a uniformly random
element, newly selected by g. As the former event in game Ψ never occurs because
the event BG1 never occurs, the distributions are equal.
As both games have access to the same random function f , the second and
third round function outputs will have equal distributions.
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In both games, yL ·(kL)−1 will be the input to the fourth round function, which
is again g. In game Ψ˜ the output is always a uniformly random element, newly
selected by g, unless yL · (kL)−1 = xR · kR, in which case the output is equal to the
output of the first round function. In game Ψ, if xR · kR has already been queried
to the Og-oracle, but not as input to the first round function, the output of the
round function is the corresponding oracle answer. If yL · (kL)−1 = xR · kR, then
the output is equal to the output of the first round function, else it is a uniformly
random element newly selected by g. As the former event in game Ψ never occurs
because the event BG2 never occurs, the distributions are equal.
As A does not ask a query if it can determine the answer based on previous
queries, we see that the inverse permutation oracle, using P−1, yields analogous
distributions. Thus, the distributions for the two games must be equal. 
Let us show that the distributions of TΨ˜ and TR˜ are identical, unless the same
value is input to f on two separate occasions. Here we also define when a key is
"bad" as we did above, but altered such that it pertains to our current oracles.
Definition 42. For every specific key k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2 and function g ∈R
FG→G, define Bad(k, g) to be the set of all possible and consistent A-transcripts σ
satisfying at least one of the following events:
B1: ∃1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc, such that
xLi · kL · g(xRi · kR) = xLj · kL · g(xRj · kR)
B2: ∃1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc, such that
yRi · (kR)−1 ·
(
g(yLi · (kL)−1)
)−1
= yRj · (kR)−1 ·
(
g(yLj · (kL)−1)
)−1
B3: ∃1 ≤ i, j ≤ qc, such that
xLi · kL · g(xRi · kR) = yRj · (kR)−1 ·
(
g(yLj · (kL)−1)
)−1
B4: ∃1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤ qf , such that
xLi · kL · g(xRi · kR) = x′j
B5: ∃1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤ qf , such that
yRi · (kR)−1 ·
(
g(yLi · (kL)−1)
)−1
= x′j
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Lemma 43. Let k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2. For any possible and consistent A-transcript
σ, we have that
Pr
k,g
[σ ∈ Bad(k, g)] ≤
(
q2c + 2qfqc + 2 ·
(
qc
2
))
· |G|−1.
Proof. We have that σ ∈ Bad(k, g) if it satisfies a Bi for some i = {1, . . . , 5}.
Using that kL, kR are uniform and independently chosen, and g ∈R FG→G, we may
achieve an upper bound on the individual event probabilities, and then use the
union bound.
There are
(
qc
2
)
many ways of picking i, j such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc, also, qfqc
many ways of picking i, j such that 1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤ qf , and q2c many ways of
picking i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qc. The probability that two elements chosen from
G are equal is |G|−1, so we may bound each event accordingly and achieve, using
the union bound, that
Pr
k,g
[σ ∈ Bad(k, g)] = Pr
k,g
[
5∨
i=1
Bi occurs |σ
]
≤
5∑
i=1
Pr
k,g
[Bi occurs |σ]
≤
(
qc
2
)
· |G|−1 +
(
qc
2
)
· |G|−1 + q2c · |G|−1 + qfqc · |G|−1 + qfqc · |G|−1
=
(
q2c + 2qfqc + 2
(
qc
2
))
· |G|−1.

Lemma 44. Let σ be a possible and consistent A-transcript, then
Pr
Ψ˜
[TΨ˜ = σ|σ 6∈ Bad(k, g)] = Pr
R˜
[TR˜ = σ] .
The following proof is based on the proof in [GR04] which refers to [NR99] for
the first part of their argument. We need the generalization of this argument and
so also include it.
Proof. Since σ is a possible A-transcript, we have for all 1 ≤ i ≤ qc, 1 ≤ j ≤
qf , 1 ≤ k ≤ qg:
CA
[{〈x1, y1〉, . . . , 〈xi, yi〉}P , {〈x′1, y′1〉, . . . , 〈x′j, y′j〉}f , {〈x′′1, y′′1〉, . . . , 〈x′′k, y′′k〉}g]
∈ {(+, xi+1), (−, yi+1), (Of , x′j+1), (Og, x′′k+1)}.
Therefore, TR˜ = σ if and only if ∀1 ≤ i ≤ qc,∀1 ≤ j ≤ qf , and ∀1 ≤ k ≤ qg, the
i, j, k’th respective answers R˜ gives are yi or xi, and x′j and x′′k, respectively. As
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A never repeats any part of a query, we have, by the definition of R˜, that the i’th
cipher-query answer is an independent and uniform element of G2, and as f and
g were modelled as random function oracles, so too will their oracle outputs be
independent and uniform elements of G. Hence,
Pr
R˜
[TR˜ = σ] = |G|−(2qc+qf+qg).
For the second part of this proof, we fix k, g such that σ 6∈ Bad(k, g) and seek
to compute Pr
f,h
[TΨ˜ = σ]. Since σ is a possible A-transcript, we have that TΨ˜ = σ
if and only if
• yi = Fg,f,f,g(xi · k) · k for all 1 ≤ i ≤ qc,
• y′j = f(x′j) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ qf , and
• y′′k = g(x′′k) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ qg (note that g = h here.)
If we define
Xi := x
L
i · kL · g(xRi · kR)
Yi := y
R
i · (kR)−1 ·
(
g(yLi · (kL)−1)
)−1
,
then (yLi , yRi ) = Ψ˜(xLi , xRi ) if and only if
kR · f(Xi) = (xRi )−1 · Yi and Xi · f(Yi) = yLi · (kL)−1,
where the second equality of the latter is equivalent to (kL)−1 · (f(Yi))−1 = (yLi )−1 ·
Xi. Observe that, for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc, Xi 6= Xj (by B1 ) and Yi 6= Yj (by B2.)
Similarly, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qc, Xi 6= Yj (by B3.) Also, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ qc and for all 1 ≤
j ≤ qf , x′j 6= Xi (by B4 ) and x′j 6= Yi (by B5.) Hence, σ 6∈ Bad(k, g) implies that
all inputs to f are distinct. This then implies that Prf,h [TΨ˜ = σ] = |G|−(2qc+qf+qg)
as h was also modelled as a random function, independent from g. Thus, as we
assumed that k and g were chosen such that σ 6∈ Bad(k, g),
Pr
Ψ˜
[TΨ˜ = σ|σ 6∈ Bad(k, g)] = |G|−(2qc+qf+qg) = Pr
R˜
[TR˜ = σ] .

5.3 Proof of Theorem 31
To complete the proof of Theorem 31, we combine the above lemmas into the
following probability estimation.
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Proof of Theorem 31. Let Γ be the set of all possible and consistent A-transcripts
σ such that A(σ) = 1. In the following, we ease notation, for the sake of the
reader. We let BadG(k) be denoted by BadG and Bad(k, g) by Bad. Furthermore,
we abbreviate inconsistency as incon.. Let us consider the cases between Ψ, Ψ˜ and
R˜.
|PrΨ [CA(TΨ) = 1]− PrΨ˜ [CA(TΨ˜) = 1]|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ [TΨ = σ]− PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ])
∣∣∣∣∣+ PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ incon.]
≤
∑
σ∈Γ
|PrΨ [TΨ = σ | σ 6∈ BadG]− PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ]| · Prk [σ 6∈ BadG]
+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ [TΨ = σ | σ ∈ BadG]− PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ BadG]
∣∣∣∣∣
+ PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ incon.]
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ [TΨ = σ | σ ∈ BadG]− PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ BadG]
∣∣∣∣∣+ qc(qc − 1)|G|−1,
where we in the last estimate used Lemma 41 and a consideration of the maximal
amount of possible inconsistent pairs.
At the same time,
|PrΨ˜ [CA(TΨ˜) = 1]− PrR˜ [CA(TR˜) = 1]|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ]− PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ])
∣∣∣∣∣+ PrR˜ [TR˜ incon.] + PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜incon.]
≤
∑
σ∈Γ
|PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ | σ 6∈ Bad]− PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ]| · Prk [σ 6∈ Bad]
+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ | σ ∈ Bad]− PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ Bad]
∣∣∣∣∣
+ PrR˜ [TR˜ incon.] + PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜incon.]
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ | σ ∈ Bad]− PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ Bad]
∣∣∣∣∣+
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2 + 2
(
qc
2
)
|G|−1,
where we in the last estimate used Lemma 44 and the proof of Lemma 38.
Let us use the above in a temporary estimate,
|PrΨ [CA(TΨ) = 1]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]|
= |PrΨ [CA(TΨ) = 1]− PrΨ˜ [CA(TΨ˜) = 1]|
+ |PrΨ˜ [CA(TΨ˜) = 1]− PrR˜ [CA(TR˜) = 1]|
+ |PrR˜ [CA(TR˜) = 1]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ [TΨ = σ | σ ∈ BadG]− PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ BadG]
∣∣∣∣∣+ qc(qc − 1)|G|−1
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+∣∣∣∣∣∑
σ∈Γ
(PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ | σ ∈ Bad]− PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ]) · Prk [σ ∈ Bad]
∣∣∣∣∣+
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2 + 2
(
qc
2
)
|G|−1
+
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2, (5)
where we in the last estimate also used Lemma 38.
We may assume WLOG that∑
σ∈Γ
PrΨ [TΨ = σ | σ ∈ BadG] · Prk [σ ∈ BadG] ≤
∑
σ∈Γ
PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ] · Prk [σ ∈ BadG]
and likewise,∑
σ∈Γ
PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ | σ ∈ BadG] · Prk [σ ∈ BadG] ≤
∑
σ∈Γ
PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ] · Prk [σ ∈ BadG] ,
such that by Lemma 40, respectively Lemma 43, we get the following continued
estimate from (5), using the triangle inequality and that |Γ| ≤ |G|2qc+qf+qg (every
combination of query elements).
|PrΨ [CA(TΨ) = 1]− PrR [CA(TR) = 1]|
≤ 2
∑
σ∈Γ
PrΨ˜ [TΨ˜ = σ] · Prk [σ ∈ BadG] + 2qc(qc − 1)|G|−1
+ 2
∑
σ∈Γ
PrR˜ [TR˜ = σ] · Prk [σ ∈ Bad]
+ 2
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2
≤ 2|Γ| · |G|−(2qc+qf+qg) ·max
σ∈Γ
Prk [σ ∈ BadG] + 2qc(qc − 1)|G|−1
+ 2|Γ| · |G|−(2qc+qf+qg) ·max
σ∈Γ
Prk [σ ∈ Bad]
+ 2
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2
≤ 4qgqc · |G|−1 + 2qc(qc − 1)|G|−1 + 2
(
q2c + 2qfqc + 2
(
qc
2
))
|G|−1 + 2
(
qc
2
)
|G|−2
= (2q2c + 4qgqc + 4qfqc + 2q
2
c − 2qc)|G|−1 + 2
(
qc
2
)(
2|G|−1 + |G|−2) .

If we denote the total amount of queries as q = qc + qf + qg, then we may
quickly estimate and reword the main theorem as:
Theorem 45. Let f, g be modelled as random oracles, let k = (kL, kR) ∈R G2, let
Ψf,gk (x) = Fg,f,f,g(x ·k) ·k, and let R ∈R PG2→G2. Then, for any 4-oracle adversary
A, with at most q total queries, we have∣∣∣Pr [AΨ,Ψ−1,f,g = 1]− Pr [AR,R−1,f,g = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ 2(3q2 − 2q)|G|−1 + (q2 − q)|G|−2.
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Proof. Given Theorem 31, we get, by using that qf , qg ≥ 0,
q2c + 2qfqc + 2qgqc + q
2
c − qc
= 2(q2c + qfqc + qgqc)− qc
≤ 2(q2c + qfqc + qgqc) + (2(qf + qg)2 + 2(qfqc + qgqc)− qf − qg)− qc
= 2(q2c + 2qfqc + q
2
f + 2qfqg + 2qgqc + q
2
g)− (qc + qf + qg)
= 2(qc + qf + qg)
2 − (qc + qf + qg)
= 2q2 − q.
As 2 ·
(
qc
2
)
= q2c − qc ≤ q2 − q, we get the final estimate by some reordering. 
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6 Quantum Pseudorandom Permutations
A major result in Quantum Cryptography is Zhandry’s result [Zha16] on the im-
plication of the existence of Quantum One-Way Functions to the existence of
Quantum Pseudorandom Permutations . His work escapes the use of the existence
of One-Way Functions (OWFs) implying the existence of Pseudorandom Genera-
tors, implying the existence of Pseudorandom Functions , which in turn imply the
existence of Pseudorandom Permutations (PRPs), as we know from the classical
setting. Instead, Zhandry analyzes PRP constructions and defines an informa-
tion theoretic object called a Function to Permutation Converter (FPC) which he
claims lies implicit in many constructions of PRPs (especially those from OWFs.)
The well-written article refers to many classical results to get its main result, how-
ever, one lemma in particular refers to a collection of works based around card
shuffles. In the following, we attempt to reproduce Zhandry’s work, but over an
arbitrary group, and in doing so, aim to generalize the card shuffle results as well.
6.1 Generalizing Zhandry’s Main Result
Let us first consider what it means to be a Quantum Pseudorandom Permutation.
In the classical setting, we consider an adversary employing an efficient computer,
i.e. it is a polynomial-time algorithm. The classical adversary interacts with the
oracle, sending and receiving bit strings. In the quantum setting, we have an
adversary who can use a quantum computer, which does not have polynomial
running time. The oracle interactions may be modelled in two ways: using only
classical queries (e.g. as we modelled in the first part of the thesis) or using
quantum superposition queries. It is not entirely important for this thesis what
the quantum superposition queries are but it should be noted that using such
superposition queries, an adversary may in theory query the entire message space
using only polynomially many queries, giving us a very strong security model.
In Zhandry’s case, he shows security against the latter adversary: a quantum
computer asking quantum superposition queries.
Intuitively, a Function to Permutation Converter (FPC) is an algorithm P
on a domain and image space X, making oracle queries to a function O, such
that PO, i.e. the algorithm P making calls to the oracle O, is a permutation
on X. It must also hold that PO is indistinguishable from a uniformly random
permutation, whenever O is a uniformly random function. Note that this intuitive
definition works just as well if we consider X = G to be an arbitrary group.
Using a classical FPC which is secure on the entire domain X, i.e. when the
adversary makes |X| queries, we may build a quantum-secure FPC by the following
reduction: Assume there exists a quantum FPC adversary which the classical FPC
adversary runs as a subroutine. As the classical FPC adversary may query the
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entire domain, it can answer any query made by the quantum FPC adversary and
the reduction may be completed. If we assume that the oracle function employed
by the quantum-secure FPC is a quantum-secure PRF, then we immediately get
a quantum-secure PRP.
6.1.1 Preliminaries
We wish to use Zhandry’s notation, for its convenience, and therefore generalize
some notions and introduce others.
Recall that we consider the positive integer λ to be the security parameter, spec-
ified in unary per convention. We assume that for each λ there exists a uniquely
specified group G(λ) = Gλ ∈ G with size |Gλ| ≥ 2λ.
Definition 46. A CComp- (resp. QComp-) one-way function is an efficient
classical function OWF : Gλ → G∗ such that, for any efficient classical (resp.
quantum) adversary A, the probability that A inverts OWF on a random input is
negligible. That is, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that
Pr
x∈RGλ
[OWF (A(λ,OWF(x))) = OWF(x)] < negl(λ).
Definition 47. A (C,Q)-pseudorandom function (PRF), for a pair (C,Q) ∈
{(CComp,CQuery), (QComp,CQuery), (QComp,QQuery)} is a family of efficient clas-
sical functions PRFm,n : Gλ × Gm → Gn such that the following holds. For any
efficient (resp. quantum) adversary A, A cannot distinguish PRFm,n(k, ·), for a
random k ∈R Gλ, from a uniformly random function O ∈R FGm→Gn, the set of
functions from Gm to Gn. That is, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such
that ∣∣∣∣ Prk∈RGλ [APRFm,n(k,·)(λ) = 1]− Pr [AO(·)(λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < negl(λ).
If PRF : G×G→ G, for some groupG ∈ G, we say that it is a pseudorandom
function on G.
Let us explain some of the notation used in the above definitions. (C,Q) rep-
resents the computational capability of the adversary and the type of queries it
is allowed. Hence, (CComp,CQuery) implies classical computation with classical
queries, (QComp,CQuery) implies quantum computation with classical queries, and
(QComp,QQuery) implies quantum computation with quantum queries. Note that
we do not consider classical adversaries making quantum queries.
We make one, rather large, assumption in this part of the thesis, which is that
we assume the following theorem holds over groups G ∈ G.
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Theorem 48. If CComp-one-way functions exist, then so do (CComp,CQuery)-
PRFs. Moreover, if QComp-one-way functions exist, then so do (QComp,QQuery)-
PRFs.
The above theorem, in the bit strings case, follows by combining the results of
[GGM86, HILL99, Zha12].
We also redefine our notion of a Pseudorandom Permutation, as this will be
crucial to the remainder of Zhandry’s work, btu does not impact our prior work.
Definition 49. A (C,Q,D)-pseudorandom permutation (PRP), for an or-
dered pair (C,Q) ∈ {(CComp,CQuery), (QComp,CQuery), (QComp,QQuery)} and
D ∈ {LargeD, AnyD} is a family of efficient classical function pairs PRPo : Gλ ×
Go → Go and PRP−1o : Gλ ×Go → Go such that the following holds.
First, for every key k and integer o, the functions PRPo(k, ·) and PRP−1o (k, ·)
are inverses of each other. That is, PRP−1o (k,PRPo(k, x)) = x for all k, x. This
implies that PRPo(k, ·) is a permutation.
Second, for any polynomially-bounded o = o(λ) and any efficient adversary A,
A cannot distinguish PRPo(k, ·) for a random k ∈R Gλ from a uniformly random
permutation P ∈R PGo→Go. We consider the SPRP variant where A has access to
both P and P−1. That is, there exists a negligible negl(·) such that∣∣∣∣ Prk∈RGλ
[
APRPo(k,·),PRP−1o (k,·)(λ) = 1
]
− Pr
[
AP (·),P−1(·)(λ) = 1
]∣∣∣∣ < negl(λ).
We remark that (C,Q) works as before, but now the adversary also gets the
same type of query access to the inverse permutations. We also introduced the
notation D, where D = LargeD means that we only require the security to hold
for groups G whose sizes are also lower-bounded by a polynomial and D = AnyD
means that security must hold for arbitrarily sized groups (small as well as large.)
We often suppress the o in Go, and write G, if o is already understood from the
context.
Finally, we define the Group-based Function to Permutation Converters (GF-
PCs).
Definition 50. Let Q ∈ {CQuery, QQuery}, D ∈ {LargeD, AnyD}. Fix a sequence
of functions Q in o, λ. A (Q,D,Q)-GFPC is a family of pairs of efficient classical
oracle algorithms Fo,Ro, where:
• Fo,Ro take as input λ and x ∈ Go, and output y ∈ Go,
• There exist polynomials m(o, λ), n(o, λ) such that Fo,Ro make queries to a
function O : Gm → Gn,
• Fo,Ro are efficient, i.e. make at most poly(o, λ) queries to O,
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• Fo,Ro are inverses: ROo (λ,FOo (λ, x)) = x for all x ∈ Go and all oracles O,
• Fo,Ro are indistinguishable from a random permutation and its inverse, given
query access.
The last property is saying that if o(λ) is any polynomially-bounded function
(with the added lower bound if D = LargeD) and q(λ) = q(o(λ), λ) is any function
in Q, then for any adversary A making at most q = q(λ) queries (either classical
or quantum, depending on Q), there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that∣∣∣Pr [AFOo (λ,·),ROo (λ,·)(λ) = 1]− Pr [AP,P−1(λ) = 1]∣∣∣ < negl(λ).
We remark here that we are unsure whether a GFPC lies in the construction
of pseudorandom permutations on groups as we are simply generalizing Zhandry’s
results rather than his investigation. Our group-based constructions (EM, Feistel)
used PRFs from G to G rather than from one group to another, which might of
course be a possibility in other constructions, so we have allowed for this in the
generalization of the FPCs.
6.1.2 Main Results
Recall that what we wish to show is, if quantum one-way functions exist, then so do
quantum pseudorandom permutations. For this, we rely heavily on the following
main lemma.
Lemma 51. Let Q be the set of all polynomials. If (C,Q)-PRFs exist and (C,Q,Q)-
GFPCs exist, then (C,Q,D)-PRPs exist.
Proof. In order to prove the lemma, it suffices to show it in the case of the triple
(QComp,QQuery, AnyD) as the other cases are analogous. We prove it by a hybrid
argument.
Hybrid 0: Give the adversary the permutations P (x) = PRPo(k, x) = F
PRFm,n(k,·)
o (λ, x)
and P−1(x) = PRP−1o (k, x) = R
PRFm,n(k,·)
o (λ, x), where k ∈R Gλ. This is the
base case where the GFPCs employ the PRF.
Hybrid 1: Give the adversary the permutations P (x) = FO(·)o (λ, x) and P−1(x) =
R
O(·)
o (λ, x), for a uniformly random O ∈R FGm→Gn . This is our interme-
diate case, where the PRF is exchanged with a random function.
Hybrid 2: Give the adversary the permutations P (x) = R(x) and P−1(x) = R−1(x),
where R,R−1 are uniformly random permutations on Go.
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For the case between Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 1, we make the following reduc-
tion. Assume there exists an adversary A which distinguishes between Hybrid 0
and Hybrid 1 with non-negligible probability. Construct the PRF distinguisher
Af (λ) = AF f(·)o (λ,·),Rf(·)o (λ,·)(λ), where f : Gm → Gn. If f(·) = PRFm,n(k, ·), then
A’s view is identical to Hybrid 0. If f(·) = O(·), then A’s view is identical to
Hybrid 1. For any quantum query A asks its oracle, A may reply using only a
polynomial amount of queries to its own oracle, by the third property of GFPCs.
The advantage of A distinguishing between the PRF and a random function is
equal to A’s distinguishing possibility i.e. non-negligible, a contradiction. We
therefore get that for some negligible function negl′(·),∣∣∣∣ Prk∈RGλ
[
AFPRFm,n(k,·)o (λ,·),RPRFm,n(k,·)o (λ,·)(λ) = 1
]
− Pr
[
AFO(·)o ,RO(·)o (λ) = 1
]∣∣∣∣ < negl′(λ).
For the case between Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2, we need only look to the last
property of GFPCs, which gives us that there exists a negligible function negl′′(·)
such that∣∣∣Pr [AFO(·)o ,RO(·)o (λ) = 1]− Pr [AR(·),R−1(·)(λ) = 1]∣∣∣ < negl′′(λ).
Combining these results, we get that∣∣∣∣ Prk∈RGλ [AFPRFm,n(k,·)o (λ,·),RPRFm,n(k,·)o (λ,·)(λ) = 1]− Pr [AR(·),R−1(·)(λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣
≤ negl′(λ) + negl′′(λ) = negl(λ),
by a simple application of the triangle inequality. 
By this lemma, we need only show that the respective GFPCs exist (as Theo-
rem 48 gives us the existence of the PRFs.) By [PRS02], we have a classical query
GFPC, which gives us the following.
Lemma 52. Let Q be the set of polynomially-bounded functions, then we have that
(CQuery, LargeD,Q)-GFPCs exist.
Using this lemma and Theorem 48 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 53. For C ∈ {CComp,QComp}, if C-one-way functions exist, then
(C,CQuery, LargeD)-PRPs exist.
Here Zhandry remarks that we could possibly use Feistel networks to get the
end result, however, he does not know how to do so. We have therefore tried to
do so, but failed in trying to even get a reduction to the Hidden-Shift Problem,
though there were many promising attempts. We therefore also encourage any
reader to attempt such a proof.
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Consider that if the amount of queries was q = |Go|, then any adversary (pos-
sibly inefficient) may query the entire domain and image of the GFPC, regardless
of query type. In this way, the distinction between classical and quantum GFPCs
disappears. As GFPCs were defined for arbitrary adversaries, this poses no prob-
lems even if adversaries making all those queries are inefficient. Let us therefore
introduce the following definition.
Definition 54. The family of pairs (Fo,Ro) is a D-Full Domain GFPC if it is a
(CQuery,D,Q)-GFPC where Q contains a function q(o, λ) such that q(o, λ) ≥ |Go|.
If an adversary has access to the entire output table of Fo and Ro, then the
type of queries it makes is irrelevant, hence, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 55. Let Q be any class of functions. Then a D-Full Domain GFPC is
also a (QQuery,D,Q)-GFPC.
The following lemma is given by Zhandry under the explanation that sev-
eral articles4, centered around card shuffles, give the existence of Full-Domain
FPCs. Especially three articles build upon each other: [HMR12, RY13, MR14].
In [HMR12], Hoang, Morris, and Rogaway introduce a Swap-or-Not Shuffle on bit
strings which they show generalizes to arbitrary domains and works for LargeD.
In [MR14], Morris and Rogaway consider the Mix-and-Cut Shuffle of [RY13] and
refine it into the Sometimes-Recurse Shuffle, which they show, when instantiated
with the Swap-or-Not Shuffle as an "inner shuffle", gives AnyD security on arbi-
trary domains. Using this work, we get the following lemma as long as we may
order and encode a group efficiently, i.e. make a bijection from an ordered set of
group elements of G to the set of positive integers of size |G|, in polynomial-time.
Lemma 56. AnyD-Full Domain GFPCs exist.
This will suffice for our generalization of Zhandry’s result, however, we attempt
to generalize the shuffles to work on arbitrary groups, without any encoding, in
the next section. This is because we feel that the encoding sacrifices the structure
of the group, which we believe may be interesting to preserve. Regardless, what
these articles intuitively do is make a good PRP and then make it even better,
using Lemma 56. This leads to an improvement of Corollary 53.
Corollary 57. For C ∈ {CComp,QComp}, if C-one-way functions exist, then
(C,CQuery,AnyD)-PRPs exist.
Combining Lemma 48, Lemma 51, Lemma 56, and Lemma 55, we get Zhandry’s
main result, but now for arbitrary groups.
4For a full list refer to [Zha16].
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Theorem 58. The existence of QComp-one-way functions implies the existence of
(QComp,QQuery,AnyD)-PRPs.
This result shows that even the concept of an FPC is generalizable to arbitrary
groups and reenforces the idea that strong results on bit strings could hold on
arbitrary groups. Based on this result we might already consider that groups could
be of use in quantum cryptography, especially given that the results of Kuwakado
and Morii [KM10, KM12] seem to only apply to bit strings and not necessarily to
arbitrary groups (see [AR17].)
40
7 Generalizing Card Shuffles
In the previous section, we reproduced Zhandry’s result over arbitrary groups but
assumed the existence of an efficient ordering of group elements and encoding to
the integers in order to do so. In this section, we consider whether the card shuffles
of [HMR12] and [MR14] may be generalized to arbitrary groups, so that we may
discard the assumption. The first shuffle construction, Swap-or-Not, leads to the
creation of a new shuffle we choose to call Scoot-or-Not, due to the fact that it no
longer swaps elements, but rather "scoots"5 the elements. Despite spending time
and effort, the second shuffle construction, Sometimes-Recurse, does not quite
generalize, for reasons we briefly discuss.
7.1 Swap-or-Not and Scoot-or-Not Shuffles
The Swap-or-Not (SN) shuffle is a new way to turn a PRF into a PRP. It can
do so in a bit string format or even an arbitrary finite domain size, as long as
the domain is ordered. This is useful in order to encipher information that is not
necessarily in a 2n sized domain, e.g. credit-card numbers which are usually in a
10n sized domain. Black and Rogaway [BR02] also considered this problem but
only gave enciphering schemes for "small" and "large" domains. The beauty of
the SN shuffle is that it works over any arbitrarily sized domain and even allows
an adversary to query almost the entire domain!
Let us start by briefly explaining the terminology used in this section, in terms
of an encryption scheme. Consider a deck X of N ∈ N cards, which is our domain.
For example, X could be {0, 1}n for N = 2n, X could be [N ], i.e. the group of
integers with addition modulo N , or X could be some other group G. A shuffle
is then a permutation on the domain, or rather, the block-cipher used to permute
the enciphering elements. We may even cut the deck, as one would in a game of
poker, which would have the analogue of taking subsets, or perhaps subgroups.
The randomness used in the shuffling of the deck can be considered the random
key.
In this section, we use the concept of an oblivious shuffle, originally suggested
by Moni Naor. In such a shuffle, we need only consider the trace of a single card,
rather than trace all, or a lot, of the other cards, in order to prove security.
The SN shuffle itself works in a series of "rounds" where elements in a domain
are swapped, or not, and the output of the shuffle is then the permuted domain.
In Figure 3 and Figure 4, we give the definition of a single round (in the bit string
case) and the generalized construction in a finite abelian group, respectively.
In Figure 3, we use X = (Z/2Z)n, where each card is X ∈ {0, 1}n, i.e. the
5As formulated by Gorjan Alagic
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Algorithm 7.1: SN [1, (Z/2Z)n ,⊕](X)
K ∈R {0, 1}n
for the pair of positions {X,K ⊕X}
do

b ∈R {0, 1}
if b = 1
then swap the cards at positions X and K ⊕X
Figure 3: A Single Round Swap-or-Not Shuffle
bit strings. At first a random key K ∈R {0, 1}n is selected for the round. Each
X is paired up with K ⊕ X, which is a unique pairing by the abelian property
of (Z/2Z)n under the XOR operation, ⊕. A random bit is then used to decide
whether the pair is swapped or not. The shuffle can be repeated for more rounds
where each round uses an independently chosen random key and independently
chosen random bit b. The random bits may be instantiated with random round
functions Fi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, for each round i. The shuffle is repeated for all
X ∈ X using the same K and b. We now give the r-round SN shuffle over an
abelian group.
Algorithm 7.2: SN [r, [N ] ,+](X)
for i := 1 to r
do

X ′ := Ki −X, Xˆ := max(X,X ′)
if Fi(Xˆ) = 1
then redefine X := X ′
return (X)
Figure 4: abelian Group Swap-or-Not Shuffle for r rounds
In Figure 4 we consider the abelian group [N ] = Z/NZ with addition modulo
N as its operation. The keys Ki ∈ [N ] are chosen independently at random,
but only differ from round to round, they are not rechosen for each element X ∈
[N ]. Likewise, the Fi : [N ] → {0, 1} are independently chosen round functions,
that vary only per round, not per element X ∈ [N ]. When repeated on each
element X ∈ [N ], this shuffle permutes the elements of the deck and has an
inverse, which is gotten by reversing the rounds, i.e. going from round r to round
1. Using SN [r, [N ] ,+], [HMR12] show that in the security setting, an adversary
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may distinguish between being given the shuffle and a random permutation with
advantage at most
8N3/2
r + 4
(
q +N
2N
)r/4+1
,
when limited to at most q total queries. For good security, the above bound allows
only up to q = (1 − ε)N adversarial queries, where ε > 0 is some fixed value,
which is why complete information theoretic security escapes us. Hoang, Morris,
and Rogaway also consider "tweaking" their shuffle, which we have not considered
generalizing.
The SN shuffle itself has two main properties: the same algorithm applies the
permutation and the inverse permutation, by simply reversing the rounds, and the
elements are uniquely swapped in every round.
Let us try to make a direct generalization of the SN shuffle to an arbitrary
group G. We first notice that the max function needs an ordering on the elements,
which is not a problem on the integers but might be for other groups (consider
very large groups or ones with complex structures.) As the authors remark as
well, the choice of the max function is not entirely important and could have been
exchanged with some other function able to pick a canonical element in the forward
and inverse permutation algorithms. Let us now consider the generalized pairing
function, k ·x−1. In G, we cannot be certain that elements are swapped. Consider
an element x ∈ G and a key k ∈R G. Let us say that the algorithm pairs x with
k · x−1. At the same time it also pairs k · x−1 with k · (k · x−1)−1 = k · x · k−1,
which, unless G is abelian, will not equal x in most cases. This also means that we
cannot use the same pairing function for the forward permutation and the inverse
permutation. As we are not able to directly generalize the shuffle, we use these
considerations and construct the following Scoot-or-Not Shuffle (SC), see Figure 5.
Algorithm 7.3: SC [r,G, ·](x)
for i := 1 to r
do

x′ := ki · x, xˆ := x′ · x−1
if fi(xˆ) = 1
then redefine x := x′
return (x)
Algorithm 7.4: SC−1 [r,G, ·](x)
for i := 1 to r
do

x′ := k−1i · x, xˆ := x′ · x−1
if fi(xˆ−1) = 1
then redefine x := x′
return (x)
Figure 5: Scoot-or-Not Shuffle and its Inverse Shuffle
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We remark that the ki ∈ G and round functions fi : G → {0, 1} for each i
are uniformly chosen at random. In our definition of the SC shuffle, we note that
our use of xˆ is superfluous as xˆ = x′ · x−1 = ki and likewise k−1i in the inverse
shuffle. This means that regardless of the value of x, whether we "scoot" in a
round depends solely on the key, and the shuffle does so for every element when in
that round. We note that the SC shuffle can be thought of as a "selective" Group
Even-Mansour cipher with up to r keys. We mean this in the sense that, if, for
example, only two round functions, fi and fj, choose to scoot x, then x gets sent
to kj · (ki · x) in the shuffle.
The two shuffles in Figure 5 are indeed inverses. Denote EKF (x) := SC [r,G, ·] (x)
and DKF (x) := SC−1 [r,G, ·] (x), where KF is the set of keys and round functions
used in the shuffles. Let us show that DKF (EKF (x)) = x in the one round case.
Consider x ∈ G, k ∈R G and a random round function f : G → {0, 1}. From
EKF (x), we get that x′ = k · x and xˆ = x′ · x−1 = k. The round function f now
gives us two possibilities.
EKF (x) =
{
x if f(xˆ) = 0,
k · x if f(xˆ) = 1.
If EKF (x) = x, i.e. f(k) = 0, then from DKF (EKF (x)), we get x′ = k−1 · x
and xˆ = k−1 · x · x−1 = k−1. As f(xˆ−1) = f((k−1)−1) = f(k) = 0, we get
that DKF (EKF (x)) = x. If instead EKF (x) = k · x, i.e. f(k) = 1, then from
DKF (EKF (x)), we get x′ = k−1 · (k · x) = x and
xˆ = x · (k · x)−1 = x · x−1 · k−1 = k−1.
As f(xˆ−1) = f((k−1)−1) = f(k) = 1, we get that DKF (EKF (x)) = x. This also
holds for r rounds and the reversed case is analogous.
Preliminaries
We wish to prove some form of security for our shuffle, let us therefore consider
chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) security. Let us again consider the positive integer
λ to be the security parameter, specified in unary per convention. We assume
that for each λ there exists a uniquely specified group G(λ) = Gλ ∈ G with size
|Gλ| ≥ 2λ.
Definition 59. Let P : Gλ × G → G be a blockcipher on a group G ∈ G, such
that Pk(·) = P (k, ·) is a permutation on G, with inverse blockcipher P−1. For any
adversary A, we define the CCA advantage of A in carrying out an (adaptive)
chosen-ciphertext attack on P as
AdvccaP (A) =
∣∣∣∣ Prk∈RGλ [APk(·),P−1k (·)(λ) = 1]− Prpi∈RPG→G [Api(·),pi−1(·)(λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ,
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where PG→G is the set of permutations on G.
If the adversary asks no queries to the inverse oracle, then it is carrying out an
(adaptive) chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). If the adversary asks the same queries
on every run, we call the adversary non-adaptive. Define AdvccaP (A, q) to be the
maximum advantage of an adversary A, asking at most q total queries. Like-
wise, we define AdvncpaP (A, q) to be the maximum advantage of an adversary for
nonadaptive CPA attacks (NCPA).
If we assume L,M : Gλ × G → G to be blockciphers, then we may let L ◦M
denote the composed blockcipher (L ◦M)(K,K′)(X) = LK(MK′(X)). We refer to
Maurer, Pietrzak, and Renner [MPR07] for the following result.
Lemma 60 (Maurer-Pietrzak-Renner). If L and M are blockciphers on the same
message space then, for any adversary A and any q,
AdvccaM−1◦L(A, q) ≤ AdvncpaL (A, q) + AdvncpaM (A, q).
We will also need the definition of total variation distance.
Definition 61. Let µ and ν be probability distributions on Ω. The total variation
distance between distribution µ and ν is defined as
‖µ− ν‖ = 1
2
∑
x∈Ω
|µ(x)− ν(x)| = max
S⊂Ω
{µ(S)− ν(S)}.
Security of Scoot-or-Not
Fix a group G ∈ G with operation ·, where |G| = N ∈ N. We will now consider
the r-round Scoot-or-Not shuffle SC [r,G, ·] where we instantiate round i of the
shuffle using uniformly random key ki ∈R G and uniformly random bit bi ∈R {0, 1}
in place of the round function, i.e. we scoot if bi = 1.
We may consider this shuffle as a Markov chain {Wi|i ≥ 0} as each round i is
independent of the preceding and proceeding rounds. In this way, we consider the
state space of {Wi} to be the set of elements, here called cards, of G and interpret
Wi(x) to be the position of the card x at time i.
In the following, we assume that our adversary A is a non-adaptive adversary,
i.e. deterministic, making exactly q ≤ |G| queries. We then analyse the mixing
rate of the shuffle. Since A only makes q queries, we need only bound the mixing
rate for some q sized subset of the deck. Let x1, · · · , xq be the set of distinct
cards and let Zi(xj) be the vector position of the card xj at time i, defining
Zi(x1, · · · , xj) = (Zi(x1), · · · , Zi(xj)). We call the set of Zi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the
projected Scoot-or-Not shuffle. Let pi denote the stationary distribution of Zi, which
is uniform over the set of distinct q-tuples of cards, i.e. the uniform distribution
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of q samples without replacement. We denote τi the distribution of Zi and show
the following.
Theorem 62 (Rapid Mixing). Consider the Scoot-or-Not shuffle SC [r,G, ·] for
r, |G| ≥ 1, and let 1 ≤ q ≤ |G|. Fix distinct x1, . . . , xq and let {Zi|i ≥ 0} be the
corresponding projected Scoot-or-Not shuffle, let pi be its stationary distribution,
and let τi be the distribution of Zi. Then
‖τr − pi‖ ≤ 2|G|
3/2
r + 2
(
q + |G|
2|G|
)r/2+1
.
Proof. We start by doing some probability theoretic considerations. We let τ ki be
the conditional distribution of Zi given the random keys k1, · · · , kr. Since the ki
are random variables, the same will hold for τ ki , such that also
∥∥τ ki − pi∥∥ is. As
τr = E(τ
k
r ), where E signifies the probabilistic expectation, we get
‖τr − pi‖ =
∥∥E(τ kr − pi)∥∥ ≤ E(∥∥τ kr − pi∥∥),
where the inequality stems from Jensen’s inequality as the total variation distance
is half of the L1-norm, which is convex.
Let ν be a distribution on q-tuples of a set Ω, then we may define
ν(u1, · · · , uj) = Pr [Y1 = u1, · · · , Yj = uj] ,
ν(uj|u1, · · · , uj−1) = Pr [Yj = uj|Y1 = u1, · · · , Yj−1 = uj−1] ,
where (Y1, · · · , Yq) ∼ ν. In the SC shuffle, τi(u1, · · · , uj) is the probability of
the j first cards x1, · · · , xj end up in the positions u1, · · · , uj at time i and
τi(uj|u1, · · · , uj−1) is the probability of xj being in spot uj at time i when the
other cards are in given positions. An analogous definition holds for the uniformly
random pi. Using this notation, we present the following lemma, whose proof we
omit, but a slightly more general proof may be found in [MR14].
Lemma 63. Fix a finite nonempty set Ω and let µ and ν be probability distributions
supported on q-tuples of elements of Ω, and suppose that (Y1, · · · , Yq) ∼ µ, then
‖µ− ν‖ ≤
q−1∑
l=0
E (‖µ(·|Y1, · · · , Yl)− ν(·|Y1, · · · , Yl)‖) . (6)
Since the Yi are random variables, so is ‖µ(·|Y1, · · · , Yl)− ν(·|Y1, · · · , Yl)‖ for
each l < q.
Fix an integer l ∈ {0, · · · , q − 1} such that we consider the set of cards
{x1, · · · , xl} and aim to bound the expected distance between the conditional
distributions for τ ki and pi. For i ≥ 0, we therefore consider the set Si = G \
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{Zi(x1), · · ·Zi(xl)}, i.e. the set of positions that card xl+1 can be in at time i
given the positions of cards x1, · · · , xl at time i. For a ∈ Si we introduce the
notation pi(a) = τ ki (a|Zi(x1), · · ·Zi(xl)). For m = |Si| = |G| − l, we have∥∥τ ki (·|Zi(x1, · · · , xl))− pi(·|Zi(x1, · · · , xl))∥∥ = 12 ∑
a∈Si
|pi(a)− 1/m|,
for which we get the following estimate,(
E
(∑
a∈Si
|pi(a)− 1/m|
))2
≤ E
(∑
a∈Si
|pi(a)− 1/m|
)2
≤ m · E
(∑
a∈Si
(pi(a)− 1/m)2
)
≤ |G| · E
(∑
a∈Si
(pi(a)− 1/m)2
)
, (7)
by two applications of Cauchy-Schwarz and using that m ≤ |G|. We now wish to
show by induction that
E
(∑
a∈Si
(pi(a)− 1/m)2
)
≤
(
l + |G|
2|G|
)i
, (8)
for every i ≤ r. For the induction start, i = 0, consider that the initial card
positions are deterministic, such that
E
(∑
a∈S0
(pi(a)− 1/m)2
)
= (1− 1/m)2 + (m− 1) · (0− 1/m)2 = 1− 1/m < 1.
This is because S0 is the set of positions that card xl+1 could be located in at
time 0, given the positions of cards x1, · · · , xl. Since p0(a) is the probability that
xl+1 is in position a at time 0 and because the positions of the cards at time 0
are deterministic, we know exactly which a the card xl+1 is sent to. Let us now
consider the induction step and assume that Equation (8) holds for i. Define
si =
∑
a∈Si(pi(a) − 1/m)2. As E(E(X|Y )) = E(X), for independent X and Y ,
and E(cX) = cE(X), for a constant c, we need only show that
E(si+1|si) =
(
l + |G|
2|G|
)
si.
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Define the auxilliary function h : Si → Si+1,
h(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Si+1,
ki+1 · a else.
This function is well-defined: per definition of the shuffle, if a ∈ Si then either
a ∈ Si+1 or ki+1 · a ∈ Si+1. It is also bijective6, having the inverse,
h−1(b) =
{
b if b ∈ Si,
k−1i+1 · b else.
Notice also that because of the uniformity of the round function (here instan-
tiated by a random bit,) we get
pi+1(h(a)) =
{
pi(a) if ki+1 · a 6∈ Si,
1
2
pi(a) +
1
2
pi(ki+1 · a) else.
We note that
E(si+1|si) =
∑
b∈Si+1
E
(
(pi+1(b)− 1/m)2 |si
)
=
∑
a∈Si
E
(
(pi+1(h(a))− 1/m)2 |si
)
,
so we aim to bound the summands of the latter sum.
As ki+1 is independent of the other rounds, we have that
Pr [ki+1 · a = y|y ∈ G] = 1/|G|.
Recall that m = |Si| = |G| − l. By conditioning on the value of ki+1 · a we get
that
E
(
(pi+1(h(a))− 1/m)2 |st
)
=
l
|G| (pi(a)− 1/m)
2 +
1
|G|
∑
y∈Si
(
pi(a) + pi(y)
2
− 1
m
)2
,
where the sum may be rewritten as∑
y∈Si
1
4
((pi(a)− 1/m) + (pi(y)− 1/m))2
= 1
4
∑
y∈Si
(pi(a)− 1/m)2 + 14
∑
y∈Si
(pi(y)− 1/m)2 + 12(pi(a)− 1/m)
∑
y∈Si
(pi(y)− 1/m)
= m
4
(pi(a)− 1/m)2 + 14si,
6For bijectivity argument, see Appendix C.
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where we used that
∑
y∈Si(pi(y)− 1/m) = 0. Hence we get that
E
(
(pi+1(h(a))− 1/m)2 |st
)
=
4l +m
4|G| (pi(a)− 1/m)
2 +
si
4|G| ,
which further gives us, by evaluating at each a ∈ Si, that
E(si+1|si) = 4l +m
4|G|
∑
a∈Si
(pi(a)− 1/m)2 + msi
4|G|
=
4l +m
4|G| si +
msi
4|G|
=
l + |G|
2|G| si,
such that we have proven our induction step.
Let us now use this to conclude our theorem. Letting i = r in the above, we
get that
‖τr − pi‖ ≤ E(
∥∥τ kr − pi∥∥)
≤
q−1∑
l=0
E
(∥∥τ ki (·|Zi(x1, · · · , xl))− pi(·|Zi(x1, · · · , xl))∥∥) by Lemma 63
≤
q−1∑
l=0
1
2
(
|G| · E
(∑
a∈Sr
(pr(a)− 1/m)2
))1/2
by (7)
≤
q−1∑
l=0
√|G|
2
(
l + |G|
2|G|
)r/2
by (8)
≤
√|G|
2
∫ q−1
0
(
1
2
+
l
2|G|
)r/2
dl
=
√|G|
2
∫ q−1
2|G|
0
(
1
2
+ x
)r/2
· 2|G|dx
≤ |G|3/2
∫ q
2|G|
0
(
1
2
+ x
)r/2
dx
= |G|3/2
∫ q
2|G|+
1
2
1
2
yr/2dy
=
2|G|3/2
r + 2
((
q
2|G| +
1
2
)r/2+1
−
(
1
2
)r/2+1)
49
≤ 2|G|
3/2
r + 2
(
q + |G|
2|G|
)r/2+1
.

We note that the above estimate possibly may be reduced as it uses rather
large estimates. However, for our purposes, this estimate is sufficient and also
equivalent to the estimate given in [HMR12]. By an analogous argument, it is
possible to prove that the inverse SC shuffle satisfies the exact same bound. Using
Lemma 60, we may therefore obtain CCA security as well.
Theorem 64. Let P = SC [2r,G, ·], then
AdvccaP (A, q) ≤
4|G|3/2
r + 2
(
q + |G|
2|G|
)r/2+1
.
Proof. Consider P = SC [r,G, ·] for the group G ∈ G, and P−1 = SC−1 [r,G, ·],
then Lemma 60 gives us that
Advcca(P−1)−1◦P (A, q) ≤ AdvncpaP (A, q) + AdvncpaP−1 (A, q)
≤ 4|G|
3/2
r + 2
(
q + |G|
2|G|
)r/2+1
.
As (P−1)−1 is P−1 reversed, i.e. P , the above is equivalent to using P with 2r
rounds instead of r rounds. 
7.2 Generalizing the Sometimes-Recurse Shuffle
The Sometimes-Recurse shuffle (SR) is a shuffle which essentially takes a weak
PRP and turns it into a stronger PRP. Specifically, the SR shuffle takes an inner
shuffle, e.g. the SN shuffle, and uses it to shuffle the cards. Then it cuts the deck
in some predefined split, e.g. in half, and shuffles one of the new smaller decks. It
then continues the procedure recursively until there is only one card left to shuffle
which per definition is already shuffled. The security proof is based on the security
of the inner shuffle which we assume to shuffle some half amount of the cards in the
deck (or the recursive deck) to within ε > 0 of uniform. In the case of the deck of
cards being the set of integers {1, · · · , N}, whenever we make a split of the deck, we
may reenumerate the cards to be the sets {1, · · · , N/2} and {(N + 1)/2, · · · , N},
and so forth. In the arbitary group setting, simply splitting into smaller sets give
us problems with whether the sets are subgroups. If we consider using a bijection
into some smaller group, which is not necessarily a subgroup, then we might as
well do this to begin with, but then there is no reason to consider a shuffle on
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the group itself as we may use the SR and SN shuffle on the initial set of group
elements by giving it a bijection to the set of integers of size |G|, i.e. an encoding.
We leave as an open question the construction of a shuffle turning our SC
shuffle into a PRP which is secure under q = |G| queries by an adversary.
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8 Conclusion
We generalized the Even and Mansour scheme as well as the Feistel cipher to
work over arbitrary groups and proved that classical results pertain to the group
versions. We also generalized the Function to Permutation Converters of Zhandry
to get the existence of quantum-secure PRPs from the existence of quantum-secure
OWFs. Lastly, we introduced the Scoot-or-Not shuffle, a cipher based on card
shuffles.
Due to the work by Alagic and Russell in [AR17], we hope that our results open
avenues to proving that classical schemes may be made quantum-secure by gen-
eralizing them to certain groups. For further work, we suggest generalizing other
classical schemes and using the underlying group structures to do Hidden Shift
reductions, especially those schemes considered by Kaplan et al in [KLLNP16]. Al-
though it has not been included in this thesis, we have constructed a "tweakable"
cipher over arbitrary groups which does seem to have a Hidden Shift reduction.
Security proofs and further reductions for this cipher would be the basis of further
work.
I would like to thank my thesis advisor Gorjan Alagic for the topic, enlightening
questions and answers, as well as the encouragements along the way. I would also
like to thank my thesis advisor Florian Speelman for the support, fun discussions,
and for letting me be his first Master’s thesis student.
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A Proof of probability of Game X
Recall the definition of S1i , S2i , T 1i and T 2i (see p. 12.) We write Ss and Tt to denote
the final transcripts. We drop the index i if it is understood. We begin by defining
Game X’.
GAME X’: Initially, let S0 and T0 be empty. Choose k ∈R G, then answer the i+1’st
query as follows:
E-oracle query with mi+1:
1. If P (mi+1 · k) ∈ T 2i return P (mi+1 · k) · k
2. Else choose yi+1 ∈R G \ T 2i , define P (mi+1 · k) = yi+1, and return yi+1 · k.
D-oracle query with ci+1:
1. If P−1(ci+1 · k−1) ∈ T 1i , return P−1(ci+1 · k−1) · k−1.
2. Else choose xi+1 ∈R G \ T 1i , define P−1(ci+1 · k−1) = xi+1, and return xi+1 · k−1.
P -oracle query with xi+1:
1. If P (xi+1) ∈ T 2i , return P (xi+1).
2. Else choose yi+1 ∈R G \ T 2i , define P (xi+1) = yi+1, and return yi+1.
P−1-oracle query with yi+1:
1. If P−1(yi+1) ∈ T 1i , return P−1(yi+1).
2. Else choose xi+1 ∈R G \ T 1i , define P−1(yi+1) = xi+1, and return xi+1.
Notice that the only difference between Game X’ and the game defining PX
is that the latter has defined all values for the oracles beforehand while the former
"defines as it goes." Still, an adversary cannot tell the difference between playing
the Game X’ or the game defining PX . Thus, PrX′
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1
]
= PX .
What we wish to show is that
PrX
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1
]
= PrX′
[
AP,P−1E,D = 1
]
,
i.e. that no adversary A may distinguish between playing Game X and playing
Game X’, even negligibly. We will do this by showing that no adversary A may
distinguish between the outputs given by the two games. As both games begin by
choosing a uniformly random key k and as we show that for this value the games
are identical, we hereby assume such a key k to be a fixed, but arbitrary, value for
the remainder of this proof.
Considering the definitions of Game X and Game X’, we see that the two
games define their E/D- and P/P−1-oracles differently: the former defining both,
while the latter defines only the P/P−1-oracle and computes the E/D-oracle. We
show that Game X also answers its E/D-oracle queries by referring to P/P−1,
although not directly.
Given the partial functions E and P in Game X, i.e. functions having been
defined for all values up to and including the i’th query, define the partial function
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P̂ as the following.
P̂ (x)
def
=

P (x) if P (x) is defined,
E(x · k−1) · k−1 if E(x · k−1) is defined, and
undefined otherwise.
Using the above definition, defining a value for E or P implicitly defines a value
for P̂ . The first question is, whether or not P̂ is well-defined, i.e. whether there
are clashes of values (that is, differences between values differing by other than ·k
(or ·k−1)) for some x for which both P (x) and E(x · k−1) are defined.
Lemma 65. Let E and P be partial functions arising in Game X, then the partial
function P̂ is well-defined.
Proof. Proof by induction on the number of "Define" steps in Game X (i.e. steps
E− 3, D− 3, P − 3, and P−1− 3) as these are the steps where P̂ becomes defined.
The initial case of the induction proof is trivial as S0 and T0 are empty such that
no values may clash. Suppose now that in step E − 3 we define E(m) = c. The
only possibility that P̂ becomes ill-defined will occur if the new E(m) value clashes
with a prior defined P (m · k) value: If P (m · k) was not defined, then no clashes
can arise. If P (m · k) was defined, then by step E − 2, the value is E(m) · k−1,
such that there is no clash.
For D − 3, the argument is similar as E(m) will become defined as well. Al-
though, for the case where P (m · k) is defined, step D − 2 forces a new uniformly
random value of m to be chosen until no clash occurs.
Analogously, for P and P−1, no clashes will arise, hence, P̂ must be well-
defined. 
We may also consider P̂ in Game X’, in the sense that when we define a
value for P in the game, we implicitly define a value for P̂ where P̂ (x) = P (x) as
E(x · k−1) = P (x) in Game X’.
We wish now to show that the oracle query-answers of E,D, P, and P−1 in
Game X, expressed in terms of P̂ , correspond exactly to those in Game X’.
Case 1: E-oracle query. Beginning withGame X, we first note thatGame
X never defines E(m) unless m has been queried to the E-oracle, or alternately,
the D-oracle has been queried with a c such that E(m) = c. However, as A
never repeats a query if it can guess the answer, i.e. never queries any part of an
already defined E/D-oracle pair, we may assume that E(m) is undefined when m
is queried. Therefore, we see that concurrently with m being queried, we have that
P̂ (m · k) will be defined if and only if P (m · k) is defined, and P̂ (m · k) = P (m · k).
Let us consider the two cases: when P̂ (m · k) is defined and when it is undefined.
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Case 1a: When P̂ (m · k) is defined, then Game X returns c = P̂ (m · k) · k. Setting
E(m) = c leaves P̂ unchanged, i.e. the value P̂ (m · k) remains the same,
unlike the next case.
Case 1b:
Case 1b: When P̂ (m · k) is undefined, then Game X repeatedly chooses c ∈R G \ S2
uniformly until P−1(c · k−1) is undefined, i.e. the set U = {c ∈ G|P−1(c ·
k−1) 6∈ T 1}. It follows that y = c · k−1 is uniformly distributed over G \ T̂ 2.7
This can be seen by showing that S2 ∪ U { = T̂ 2 · k, where the only non-
triviality in the argument follows from the definition of P̂ . In this case,
setting E(m) = c also sets P̂ (m · k) = y, in contrast to the prior case as it is
now defined.
We now consider the same query on Game X’.
Case 1a’ : When P̂ (m · k) = P (m · k) is defined, c = P (m · k) · k is returned, and P̂ is
unchanged.
Case 1b’ : When P̂ (m · k) = P (m · k) is undefined, we choose y ∈R G \ T 2 = G \ T̂ 2,
P̂ (m · k) is set to y, and c = y · k is returned.
Thus, the behaviour of Game X and Game X’ are identical on the E-oracle
queries.
We will be briefer in our arguments for the following 3 cases as the arguments
are similar.
Case 2: D-oracle query. Here we again assume that no element of an E/D-
oracle pair (m, c), such that E(m) = c, has been queried before. Like in the above
case, we see that, as P̂ (m · k) = P (m · k), we also have P̂−1(c · k−1) = P−1(c · k−1).
Case 2a + 2a’ : When P̂−1(c · k−1) = P−1(c · k−1) is defined, then m = P−1(c · k−1) · k−1 is
returned, leaving P̂−1(c · k−1) unchanged in both games.
Case 2b + 2b’ : If P̂−1(c · k−1) = P−1(c · k−1) is undefined, then x ∈R G \ T̂ 1 is chosen
uniformly and P̂−1(c · k−1) = x, in both cases.
Thus, the behaviour of Game X and Game X’ are identical on the D-oracle
queries.
Case 3: P -oracle query. Here we instead assume that no element of a
P/P−1-oracle pair (x, y) such that P (x) = y, has been queried before.
7T̂ 1 and T̂ 2 are the corresponding sets on the query pairs of P̂ .
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Case 3a + 3a’ : Using the definition of the E- and P -oracles inGame X and the definition of
P̂ we see that P (x) is defined if and only if E(x ·k−1) is defined, but then this
also holds if and only if P̂ (x) is defined (by the assumption in the beginning
of case 3). Hence, if P̂ (x) is defined, then y = E(x · k−1) · k−1 = P̂ (x).
Indeed, both games secure this value.
Case 3b + 3b’ : If P̂ (x) is undefined, then y ∈R G\T̂ 2 is chosen uniformly and P̂ (x) is defined
to be y, in both cases.
Thus, the behaviour of Game X and Game X’ are identical on the P -oracle
queries.
Case 4: P−1-oracle query. Again, we assume that no element of a P/P−1-
oracle pair (x, y) such that P (x) = y, has been queried before.
Case 4a + 4a’ : Using the definition of Game X and the definition of P̂ , as well as our case
4 assumption, we see that P̂−1(y) is defined if and only if D(y · k) is defined.
Hence, if P̂−1(y) is defined, then x = D(y · k) · k = P̂−1(y). Indeed, both
games secure this value.
Case 4b + 4b’ : If P̂−1(y) is undefined, then x ∈R G \ T̂ 1 is chosen uniformly and P̂−1(y) is
defined to be x, in both cases.
Thus, the behaviour of Game X and Game X’ are identical on the P−1-oracle
queries. Q.E.D.
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B Proof that the probability of Game R and Game
R’ match
Recall the definition of S1i , S2i , T 1i and T 2i (see p. 12). We write Ss and Tt to denote
the final transcripts. We also introduce the following definition.
Definition 66. We say that two E/D-pairs (mi, ci) and (mj, cj) overlap if mi =
mj or ci = cj. If mi = mj and ci = cj, we say that the pairs are identical.
Likewise for P/P−1-pairs (xi, yi) and (xj, yj).
If two pairs overlap, then by the definition of the E/D- and P/P−1-oracles,
they must be identical. Therefore, WLOG, we may assume that all queries to the
oracles are non-overlapping. Let us now prove the lemma.
Lemma 67. PrR [BAD] = PrR′ [BAD].
Proof. We need to prove thatGame R has its flag set to bad if and only if Game
R’ has its flag set to bad.
"⇒": We want to show that there exists (m, c) ∈ Ss and (x, y) ∈ Tt such
that either m · k = x or c · k−1 = y (i.e. such that k becomes bad). We have to
consider the 8 cases where the flag is set to bad. All of the cases use an analogous
argument to the following: If P (m · k) is defined then P (m · k) = y = P (x) for
some (x, y) ∈ Tt such that, as overlapping pairs are identical, m · k = x.
"⇐": We assume that there exists (m, c) ∈ Ss and (x, y) ∈ Tt such that k
becomes bad. i.e. such that either m · k = x or c · k−1 = y. We need to check
that in all four oracle queries, the flag in Game R is set to bad, which needs a
consideration of 8 cases.
Assume that m · k = x, then
E-oracle on m : P (m · k) = P (x) = y ∈ T 2t ,
D-oracle on c : P (m · k) = P (x) = y ∈ T 2t ,
P -oracle on x : E(x · k−1) = E(m) = c ∈ S2s ,
P−1-oracle on y : E(x · k−1) = E(m) = c ∈ S2s .
Assume now that c · k−1 = y, then
E-oracle on m : P−1(c · k−1) = P−1(y) = x ∈ T 1t ,
D-oracle on c : P−1(c · k−1) = P−1(y) = x ∈ T 1t ,
P -oracle on x : D(y · k) = D(c) = m ∈ S1s ,
P−1-oracle on y : D(y · k) = D(c) = m ∈ S1s .

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C Bijectivity of h
We first note that h−1 is well-defined by the same argument that h is well-defined,
but by considering the inverse shuffle. If b ∈ Si, then
h(h−1(b)) = h(b) = b,
as b ∈ Si+1 per definition of h−1 : Si+1 → Si. If b 6∈ Si, then
h(h−1(b)) = h(k−1i+1 · b) = ki+1 · k−1i+1 · b = b,
because, as k−1i+1 · b ∈ Si, either k−1i+1 · b ∈ Si+1 or ki+1 · k−1i+1 · b = b ∈ Si+1, and we
already know that b ∈ Si+1 such that k−1i+1 · b 6∈ Si+1.
If a ∈ Si+1, then
h−1(h(a)) = h−1(a) = a,
per definition of h : Si → Si+1. If a 6∈ Si+1, then
h−1(h(a)) = h−1(ki+1 · a) = k−1i+1 · ki+1 · a = a,
because, as ki+1 · a ∈ Si+1, either ki+1 · a ∈ Si or k−1i+1 · ki+1 · a = a ∈ Si, but we
already know that a ∈ Si such that ki+1 · a 6∈ Si.
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